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I. INTRODUCTION  
Three weeks after the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, looters de-
scended on the artifacts in the Iraq National Museum.  Over 
ten thousand pieces were assumed destroyed or stolen,
1
 and 
the Coalition Provisional Authority estimated the losses at $12 
billion.
2
  The gravity of the privation led the Security Council 
to include language in Resolution 1483 to restrict countries 
from trading in Iraq’s pillaged antiquities, and the U.S. Con-
gress passed the Emergency Protection of Iraqi Cultural An-
tiquities Act of 2004 to enforce the measures.
3
  Several thou-
sand pieces were recovered, but thousands remain missing.
4
  In 
March 2013, Hussein ash-Shamri, the head of the Iraqi Interior 
Ministry’s Economic Crimes Department, announced that Iraq 
opened 39 cases against countries to investigate circumstances 
surrounding the missing archaeological treasures to procure 
their return.
5
 
                                                          
* M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), 
LL.M. International Law (Georgetown).  The author has taught international 
law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at 
the University of Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law 
courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan Uni-
versity and the University of Miami. 
1
 PAOLO BRUSASCO, LOOTING THE PAST: SYRIA’S CULTURAL HERITAGE 
UNDER ATTACK: ANOTHER IRAQ? 28 (2012) (reporting that an estimated 15,000 
items were stolen from the museum and 20,000 objects were vandalized); 
Lindsay E. Willis, Looting in Ancient Mesopotamia: A Legislation Scheme for 
the Protection of Iraq’s Cultural Heritage, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 221, 227-
28 (2005) (noting that fifteen to seventeen thousand items were looted or de-
stroyed). 
2 JAMES DOBBINS, SETH G. JONES, BENJAMIN RUNKLE & SIDDHARTH 
MOHANDAS, OCCUPYING IRAQ: A HISTORY OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL 
AUTHORITY 111 (2009).  
3
 Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004 Miscel-
laneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108- 429, §§ 
3001-3003, 118 Stat. 2599 (2004). 
4 US Illegally Obtained and Kept Thousands of Iraq’s Cultural Treasures, 
RT (Apr. 9, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://rt.com/op-edge/iraq-war-cultural-artifacts-
553/; Mathew Bogdanos, Fighting for Iraq’s Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 
2007, at A21 (reporting 6,000 pieces recovered). 
5 Margarita Kislova, Iraq Files Lawsuits Over Valuables Seized in 2003, 
RUSSIAN LEGAL INFORMATION AGENCY (Mar. 13, 2013, 6:13 PM), 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
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This article tenders a suppositional analysis of culpability 
for the pilferage of the artifacts.  Culpability standards are first 
assessed by using Part II’s précis of the substantive interna-
tional law that safeguards antiquities.  Part III provides a fac-
tual chronology of the looting to address the responsibility of 
Iraqis who engaged in looting after law and order collapsed and 
the obligations of invading/occupying military forces during the 
stages of jus ad bellum and jus post bellum.  The Iraqi govern-
ment presumably would prefer an equitable remedy that facili-
tates the return of missing artifacts if the items are located and 
identified; this would implicate any state that failed to halt 
black market trades.  However, if items are certified as missing 
and cannot be located within a reasonable period of time or 
were destroyed during the looting, should there be a right to 
recover damages against actors who transgressed substantive 
law and impelled the sequence of events into motion that led to 
losses?  Considering this prospect, Part IV offers a conjectural 
analysis of liability.  It is hypothetical because the Iraqi gov-
ernment may have divided political will (which might necessi-
tate a qui tam-like public interest action), it is novel to pierce 
the veil of official immunity in the context posed, the analysis 
extrapolates offenses that have previously eliminated official 
immunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity in a 
tort-like derivative civil action, and the inquiry entails pitting 
factual analyses against heuristics and the presumption that 
collateral losses can be absolved if ends justifies the means. 
II. U.S. OBLIGATIONS AND LAWS ON ANTIQUITIES 
A. Recognition of the Problem from Historical Experience 
Looting of valuables has a distant history and has served 
as a method of amassing wealth, compensating soldiers,
6
 extir-
pating extant society and culture, and subjugating a besieged 
                                                                                                                                  
http://rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20130313/266703432.html. 
6 See Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the 
Preservation of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 245, 249-50 (2006). 
3
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population.
7
  Large-scale looting transferred possession of val-
uable Egyptian property during the mid-twelfth century B.C. 
period; such thefts were prevalent through the Roman and 
Greek eras of domination.
8
  More recent examples include Brit-
ish thefts in colonial India and Egypt, and Napoleon’s armies 
looted treasures in Egypt, Italy, Germany, and Russia.9  Napo-
leon’s haul was so copious that the French briefly renamed the 
Louvre Museum the “Musée Napoleon.”10    
The Musée Napoleon became the largest museum in Eu-
rope. At the time, France considered the wartime thefts a law-
ful policy that could transfer legitimate title to the acquisi-
tions.11  The Allies placed considerable responsibility on 
German plunder during World War II and some of the cultural 
property was recovered, but restoration of antiquities deriving 
from earlier heists have not been so successful.12  
The underlying angst that results when a country of origin 
losing possession of a valuable antiquity is of profound priva-
tion to that state’s national identity, culture, history and 
                                                          
7 See Margaret M. Miles, Art as Plunder: The Ancient Origins of Debate 
About Cultural Property 39-40 (2008). 
8 Leonard D. DuBoff, Sherri burr & Michael d. Murray, Art Law: Cases 
and Materials 533 (revised ed. 2010); See generally Miles, supra note 7. 
9 See David Nicholls, Napoleon: A Biographical Companion 79 (1999); 
Cecil Gould, Trophy of Conquest: The Musee Napoleon and the Creation of 
the Louvre 41-43 (1965); John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological 
Ethics and the Reparation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part 
Two), 28 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 1, 16-20, 98-99 (2004); See,e.g., Vivek 
K. Hatti, Note, India’s Right to Reclaim Cultural and Art Treasures from 
Britain Under International Law, 32 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 465 
(2000); See also Dorothy Mackay Quynn, The Art Confiscations of the Napole-
onic Wars, 50 Am. Hist. Rev. 437 (1945). 
10 See, e.g., Diana Reid Haig, Walks Through Napoleon and Josephine’s 
Paris 123 (2004). 
11 See generally Gould, supra note 9; Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 251-
52; Cohan, supra note 9, at 16-17; Stephen Wilske, International Law and the 
Spoils of War: To the Victor the Right of Spoils? 3 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign 
Aff. 223, 227-29 (1998) (Napoleon sought to constitute a colossal museum). 
12 NOAH CHARNEY, STEALING THE MYSTIC LAMB: THE TRUE STORY OF THE 
WORLD’S MOST COVETED MASTERPIECE 100 (2010) (noting one estimate is that 
about half of Napoleon’s thefts were returned to original owners); Cohan, su-
pra note 9, at 81, 90, 95-96. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
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wealth,13 which is a menace to the preservation of all cultures 
and peoples.  An item can be stolen, sold on the black market, 
and yield shocking profits to the thief and subsequent purchas-
ers.14  It may be a formidable difficulty for the owner to reac-
quire the item if it is sold in a jurisdiction that will not enforce 
a foreign judgment that represents a genuine title of owner-
ship,15 particularly if a bona fide purchaser acquired the item.16  
Trade in stolen antiquities is recognized as such a grave prob-
lem17 that sources estimated between eighty and ninety-five 
percent of antiquities on the market lack sufficient documenta-
tion of origin.18  Moreover, if states remain taciturn, or worse, 
strive to profit from their nationals’ engagement in the private 
sale of stolen artifacts, the injection of commercialization and 
wealth motivation may belittle the intrinsic value of archaeo-
logical treasures.19 
                                                          
13 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, in 
THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL 
PROPERTY, ART AND LAW 24, 52-59 (2000); Cohan, supra note 9, at 4 (stating 
that “looting destroys not only cultural sites but also the heritage of cultural 
groups.”). 
14 Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed 
Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 409-11 (1995). 
15 Cohan, supra note 9, at 64. 
16 BARBARA T. HOFFMAN, ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY, AND 
PRACTICE 90 (2006); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. 
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1393-94 (S.D. Ind. 
1989) (choice of law questions can be complex); Kunstsammlungen Zu Wei-
mar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir. 1982) (referencing complex 
chain of title and origin questions). 
17 Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some 
Skeptical Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 217 (2007); Marion P. Forsyth, 
International Cultural Property Trusts: One Response to Burden of Proof 
Challenges in Stolen Antiquities Litigation, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 197 (2007). 
18 Kimberly L. Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves: Organized Crimes and 
the Illicit Antiquities Trade, 45 IND. L. REV. 601, 620 (2012); Geoff Edgers, 
Treasure Hunt: For Antiquities Experts, the Chase is on to Recover the Relics 
Looted From Iraq’s National Museum, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 15, 2003, 
http://www.boston.com/news/packages/iraq/globe_stories/041503_museum.ht
m. 
19
 John Henry Merryman, The Free International Movement of Cultural 
Property, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 1, 13 (1998). This belittlement of the 
intrinsic value could conceivably even be the case when titles are genuine and 
5
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B. International Law Protections During Warfare 
Given that the mass theft of artifacts historically occurred 
during combat (as countries under siege are most vulnerable 
and less capable of safeguarding antiquities), early interna-
tional law prohibitions on the pilferage and destruction of arti-
facts developed as components of humanitarian protections in 
treaties governing warfare.   
The U.S. is a party to applicable Conventions
20
 and the 
universal acceptance of the Geneva Conventions makes the 
rules customary international law.
21
  The U.S. had also prom-
ulgated many of the safeguards for valuables earlier in the Civ-
il War-era Instruction for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field (“Lieber Code”).  The Lieber Code 
differentiates works of art, museum property, and educational 
institution property as effects that should not be destroyed or 
looted during combat operations.
22
  The Lieber Code imposes 
commitments on the aggressor to protect – and not steal – cul-
tural items,
23
 and affixes obligations on the invaded country to 
reasonably secure items and locations.
24
   
Article 27 of the 1907 Convention on Law and Customs of 
War on Land states “In sieges and bombardments, all neces-
                                                                                                                                  
there is systematized international trade in antiquities. 
20
 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, May 
14, 1954, available at http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO= 
13637&language=E&order=alpha (listing the U.S. as a party).  
21
 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, LIBYA: FROM REPRESSION TO REVOLUTION 297 
(2013) (noting that the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Proto-
cols are customary international law); GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 34 (2012). 
22
 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
IN THE FIELD GENERAL ORDER NO. 100 (The Lieber Code), arts. 31-36 (Apr. 24, 
1863), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp. 
23
 Id. at art. 36 (“In no case shall [cultural objects of an adversary] be 
sold or given away, if captured by the armies of the United States, nor shall 
they ever be privately appropriated.”). 
24
 Id. at art. 35 (“Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or 
precious instruments . . . must be secured against all avoidable injury, even 
when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.”). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
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sary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings 
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, [and] 
historic monuments . . . provided they are not being used at the 
time for military purposes.”
25
  Article 56 states “All seizure of, 
destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this char-
acter, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbid-
den, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.”
26
  
This rule is affirmed in the U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10,
27
 
with the exception of military necessity, which balances the 
right to weaken opposing military forces to achieve victory with 
obligations to strictly sustain humanitarian rights.28 
International agreements were not only consummated to 
govern warfare with provisions that protect cultural heritage, 
but nations have also adopted international agreements to ex-
clusively protect cultural heritage and artifacts in the event of 
armed combat.29  In 1954, the United Nations Educational Sci-
                                                          
25 Convention (IV) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land art. 
27, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T. S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 
26, 1910) [hereinafter Convention IV]. 
26 Id. at art. 56. 
27 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE, para. 405(a), July 18, 1956 (revised July 15, 1976), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_warfare-1956.pdf. 
28 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 6(a)(b), Mar. 26, 1999, 
38 I.L.M. 769 (stating that cultural property can be destroyed when “cultural 
property has, by its function, been made into a military objective” and “there 
is no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military advantage.”); 
Convention IV, supra note 25, art. 27 (providing for a military necessity ex-
ception). Shortly after the Lieber Code was adopted, the Declarations of St. 
Petersburg in 1868 articulated that the legitimate objectives of states during 
warfare are to weaken the military forces of the enemy to the degree neces-
sary.  Symposium, The International Responses to the Environmental Impacts 
of War, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 565, 570-71 (2005); Declaration Re-
nouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868. 
29 An initial step was taken in 1935 when several countries in the West-
ern Hemisphere, including the US, signed the Treaty for the Protection of Ar-
tistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments. Protection of Artis-
tic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, 49 
Stat. 3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 289 (entered into force Aug. 26, 1935). Countries 
signing the Treaty for the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions 
7
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entific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) sponsored the 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, which protects cultural property 
during military conflict and occupation.30  The Convention re-
quires parties to “safeguard” and “prevent destruction or dam-
age [to cultural property] in the event of armed conflict,”31 and 
expresses the universality of the offense by affirming that 
“damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatso-
ever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind.”32  
The Convention proscribes the attacker from using, taking, or 
destroying cultural property unless “military necessity impera-
tively requires such a waiver,” and requires parties to “prohibit, 
prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pil-
lage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed 
against, cultural property.”33  The defender must also secure 
cultural property in all forms of military combat, which in-
cludes affixing recognizable symbols to mark cultural sites.34 
With respect to obstructing the transfer of valuable items, 
                                                                                                                                  
and Historic Monuments were required “(1) to respect cultural property and 
the persons engaged in its protection; (2) to adopt a special emblem that 
guarantees protection; (3) to adopt a special emblem to identify cultural insti-
tutions, and the application of such emblems; [and] (4) to register or prepare 
a list of protected cultural institutions.” KIFLE JOTE, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 52 (1994). 
30 The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 539 [hereinafter “Conven-
tion for the Protection of Cultural Property”] (defining cultural property as 
“(a) moveable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural her-
itage of every people . . . (b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to 
preserve or exhibit the moveable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph 
(a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives . . . [and] (c) 
centers containing a large amount of cultural property.”) 
31 Id. at arts. 3, 4. 
32 Id. at art. 11. 
33 Id. at art. 4. 
34 Id. at arts, 3, 17; Victoria A. Birov, Prize or Plunder?: The Pillage of 
Works of Art and the International Law of War, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
201, 213-14 (1998).  When the Hague Convention was adopted, there may 
have been more uncertainty over the location of cultural locations across the 
world, but with more information, international cooperation, and the mass 
media, it is more difficult to assert ignorance with respect to well-known loca-
tions of cultural property. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
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the First Protocol of the 1954 Convention also requires occupi-
ers to prevent the export of cultural property, secure and re-
turn any removed cultural property, and compensate the owner 
and good faith purchasers for an occupier’s violation of these 
fiduciary responsibilities.35  The international community may 
not have strictly observed or implemented these obligations be-
cause over a hundred countries ratified the 1954 Hague Con-
vention’s First Protocol without decisively acting to prohibit the 
trade of cultural objects taken from an occupied territory.
36
  
However, in 2003, Iraq may have been the first manifest chal-
lenge to the provisions.
37
 
There are 113 state parties to the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion,
38
 and the U.S. signed but never ratified the Convention.
39
  
Signing without ratifying a treaty still requires the signatory to 
not defeat the “object and purpose” of the treaty.
40
  Recent U.S. 
                                                          
35 Protocol to the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict para. 1(4), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. 
36 Patty Gerstenblith, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict: 
Looking Back, Looking Forward, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 677, 
688 (2009). 
37 See Draft Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, 2007-8, H.C. Bill 
[693] (Gr. Brit.), available at  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmcumeds/693/
693.pdf (providing the British Parliament with a draft cultural property bill 
that criminalized certain offenses in the Hague Convention) ; See also Miscel-
laneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-429, §§ 
3001-3003 (2004) (U.S. law reacting to pilfered antiquities in Iraq).  There 
was no long-term occupation of a country with abundant cultural artifacts 
and perhaps no comparable large-scale pillage during warfare after 1954 un-
til the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and many countries did take measures to en-
force prohibitions on the trade of Iraq’s cultural heritage after the 2003 inva-
sion. 
38 Wayne Sandholtz, The Iraqi National Museum and International Law: 
A Duty to Protect, 44 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 185, 238 (2005). 
39 Id. at 229, 232; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect 
for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 175, 
182-83 (2005). 
40
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty when . . . it has signed the treaty or has ex-
changed instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, ac-
9
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presidents have affirmed intentions to comply with the treaty’s 
requirements
41
 and scholars have called the principles that re-
quire protection of cultural property customary international 
law.
42
  Elevated obligations could also exist if a state perpe-
trates an illegal invasion and destroys or fails to preserve civil-
ian property in violation of jus in bello rules.
43
 
C. More Recent Prohibitions on Transfer and Domestic Laws 
Members of the international community have adopted 
conventions to forbid the theft and illegal trade of cultural 
property in all contexts, and this principle exists in national 
laws.  In 1970, UNESCO implemented the Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.44  The Con-
vention bans the illegal trade and wrongful assertion of owner-
ship of cultural property;45 it pronounces that cultural property 
“constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and na-
tional culture,” and affirms “its true value can only be appreci-
                                                                                                                                  
ceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to be-
come a party to the treaty”). 
41 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 232-33. 
42 Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 299-300, 302, 304-05; Birov, supra note 
34, at 225-26 (noting that  “[m]any of the provisions of the 1954 Hague Con-
vention . . . are rapidly achieving the universally binding standard of custom-
ary international law”); See generally Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Legal Re-
gime for Protecting Cultural Property During Armed Conflict, 42 A.F. L. REV. 
277 (1997). 
43 See generally DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 196 (Adam Roberts & 
Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000); see also Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 97 Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (setting terms for the preservation of property taken 
during internment of civilian populations). 
44
 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 
823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289. 
45
 Id. at art. 3, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236 (prohibiting the “import, export or 
transfer of ownership of cultural property”); Id. at art. 14, 823 U.N.T.S. at 
244 (preventing “illicit export;” requiring that State Parties “provide the na-
tional services responsible for the protection of its cultural heritage with an 
adequate budget . . .”). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:38 PM 
2015] A THEORIZATION ON EQUITY 407 
 
ated in relation to the fullest possible information regarding its 
origin, history and traditional setting.”46 
In 1972, the World Heritage Convention was adopted and 
its more than 190 members are required “not to take any delib-
erate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the 
cultural and natural heritage . . . situated on the territory of 
other States Parties to the Convention.”
47
  In addition, the 
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultur-
al Objects of 1995 is a self-executing treaty that established 
rules for states to return stolen cultural property.
48
  Shortly 
thereafter, UNESCO adopted an international code of ethics for 
professional traders in cultural property.
49
 
The importance of preserving archaeological sites with 
domestic laws garners expansive support.
50
  Many countries, 
including the U.S. and Iraq, have domestic laws that vest all 
rights to antiquities and cultural property in their countries 
and proscribe the extraction of those valuables with criminal 
penalties.
51
  The U.S. enacted the Antiquities Act of 1906 to 
                                                          
46
 Id. at preface, 823 U.N.T.S. at 232. 
47
 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Nat-
ural Heritage, arts. 6 & 16, Nov. 18, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226 
(1972). 
48
 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Ob-
jects art. 1, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1330; Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO AND 
UNIDROIT: A PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN CULTURAL OBJECTS 
(Norman Palmer ed., 1998), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/articles/s7
0-prott-1996-e.pdf (providing comparisons with the UNESCO and UNIDROIT 
protections). 
49 UNESCO International Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Proper-
ty art. 1 (1999), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001213/121320M.pdf (“Professional 
traders in cultural property will not import, export or transfer the ownership 
of this property when they have reasonable cause to believe it has been sto-
len, illegally alienated, clandestinely excavated or illegally exported.”). 
50 Derek R. Kelly, Note, Illegal Tender: Antiquities Protection and U.S. 
Import Restrictions on Cypriot Coinage, 34 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 491, 525 
(2009) (noting that a recent Harris Poll discovered that 96% of Americans 
prefer archaeological sites to be protected with laws). 
51 Willis, supra note 1, at 235-36 (offering examples of Greece, China, 
Iraq, and Mexico). 
11
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protect federal land from theft, vandalism, unauthorized exca-
vation, and to impose penalties.
52
 Further, it passed the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act of 1948, which sanctions prosecuting 
individuals for transacting in the trade of stolen foreign antiq-
uities.
53
 In 1979, Congress adopted the Archaeological Re-
sources Protection Act to further fortify the policies underlying 
the Antiquities Act of 1906.
54
  In 1983, the U.S. became a party 
to the UNESCO Convention and enacted the Convention on 
Cultural Property Implementation Act, which requires the U.S. 
Department of State to collaborate with other countries to re-
strict the transport and import of stolen artifacts into the 
U.S.
55
 
In addition to existing international law, Iraq has long had 
comprehensive retention laws that affirm sovereign public 
rights over all archaeological sites, materials, and artifacts as 
national property
56
 and those rules were applicable during the 
2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.  Rules were not heeded and en-
forced and antiquities disappeared as a result.  Relevant actors 
to the events leading to losses include the U.S., either due to 
the White House’s order of an invasion that displaced domestic 
security forces or the U.S. military’s failure to secure antiqui-
ties; the vandals and thieves who destroyed and appropriated 
cultural property; Iraqi authorities that may not have ade-
quately protected valuables; individuals who may have traded 
in or possessed stolen antiquities; or states that have obliga-
                                                          
52 The Antiquities Act of 1906,16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33. 
53 National Stolen Property Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 2314. 
54 Archeological Resource Protection Act, Pub. L. 96-95 as amended, codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-470m.  The law has been enforced on offenders.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 
F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
55 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
446, 96 Stat. 2329 (1983), codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-13 (2012) (a list of 
Members of the Convention is available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E&order=al
pha). 
56 Cohan, supra note 9, at 51-53, 67-68 (noting that Iraq’s laws were 
adopted in 1936). 
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tions to obstruct the trade in stolen cultural property.  Howev-
er, unless individual items are identified or an evidence trail is 
ascertained, obligations of the latter two actors are inconclu-
sive and might still be contingent on the reasonableness of pre-
ceding acts that created a black market. Consequently, Part III 
will concentrate on the former three actors by evaluating the 
chronology surrounding the looting of the Iraq National Muse-
um. 
III. EVENTS IN IRAQ  
A. Chronology of Looting Following Invasion 
On April 6, 2003, the Pentagon announced that the start of 
the Baghdad portion of the war plan.  U.S. aircraft began 24-
hour patrols over the city, U.S. tanks and armored vehicles 
moved in to control the ground,
57
 and the military began to se-
cure areas in Baghdad over the next three days without re-
sistance.
58
   On April 10, Major General Buford Blount, com-
mander of the Third Infantry Division, announced “Not every 
area in Baghdad is secure . . . But the central part of the city, 
the heart of the city, is secure.”
59
 
Virtually concomitant with Pentagon announcements that 
Baghdad was secure, chaos, looting, and arson began.
60
  Prior 
                                                          
57 Battles Rage in Baghdad, CNN (Apr. 6, 2003) 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/05/sprj.irq.war.main/index.html.  
58 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 186. 
59 Michael Smith, The Allies’ Next Key Objective is to Win the Peace, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
northamerica/usa/1427203/The-allies-next-key-objective-is-to-win-the-
peace.html; Street Celebrations in Some Iraqi Cities, ABC NEWS (Apr. 9, 
2003), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2003-04-09/street-celebrations-in-some-
iraqi-cities/1833402 (reporting that “US tanks have swept into Baghdad with 
little resistance”). 
60 Iraq Timeline: July 16, 1979 to January 31, 2004, THE GUARDIAN, 
http://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/page/0,12438,793802,00.html (stating that 
there was purportedly only euphoria from locals); Online Newshour, Bagh-
dad Report, PBS (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military-
jan-june03-baghdad_4-10/ (referencing John Daniszewski’s reporting from 
Baghdad: “There’s not any fighting going on” but “[t]here has been . . . wide-
13
ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:38 PM 
410 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::2 
 
to the war, the National Museum possessed between 150,000 
and 200,000 items,
61
 but on April 12, looters broke into the mu-
seum without being obstructed by U.S. forces
62
 and stole or de-
stroyed over ten thousand relics.
63
  On April 13, Robert Fisk, 
an embedded reporter from the Independent on Sunday, re-
counted his perceptions at the scene and stated: “Our feet 
crunched on the wreckage of 5,000-year old marble plinths and 
stone statuary and pots that had endured every siege of Bagh-
dad, every invasion throughout history, only to be destroyed 
when Americans came to ‘liberate’ this city.”
64
   
While several thousand antiquities were recovered,
65
 other 
pieces were sold on the international black market
66
 at high 
                                                                                                                                  
spread looting” because “there’s no police authority”);  Day 21 of the War, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2003), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/09/iraq2 (reporting that combat 
in Baghdad was limited but that “Widespread looting breaks out unhindered 
in Baghdad as government control appears to be on the brink of collapse”).  In 
addition to the chronology of looting in Baghdad, similar behavior occurred in 
Basra, where the library, university, and other public edifices were trashed.  
See REBECCA KNUTH, BURNING BOOKS AND LEVELING LIBRARIES 195 (2006). 
61 Andrew Lawler, Ten Millennia of Culture Pilfered Amid Baghdad 
Chaos, 300 SCIENCE 402, Apr. 18, 2003, at 402. 
62 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 236-37; Could U.S. Have Prevented Iraqi 
Looting?, ABC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2003), 
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129734 (stating that three members of 
the White House Cultural Property Advisory Committee officials resigned 
over the looting because they were “[a]ngered that eh U.S. military didn’t 
work to prevent the looting”). 
63 Donny George, Foreword, THE LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM, 
BAGHDAD:  THE LOST LEGACY OF ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA 1-2 (Milbry Polk & 
Angela M.H. Schuster eds., 2005)(museum curator estimating that 15,000 
objects were stolen from the museum); Willis, supra note 1, at 227-28 (report-
ing numbers suggesting that fifteen to seventy thousand pieces were looted or 
destroyed). 
64 DILIP HIRO, SECRETS AND LIES 288 (2004). 
65 Roger Atwood, Stop Thieves! Recovering Iraq’s Looted Treasures, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2004, at B2 (noting that 5,200 pieces were recovered out 
of 13,000 stolen); Bogdanos, supra note 4, at A21 (reporting that 6,000 pieces 
were recovered). 
66 See generally Matthew Bogdanos, Thieves of Baghdad (2005); Dan 
Cruickshank & David Vincent, Under Fire:  People, Places and Treasures in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel 126-27 (2003); Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling 
the International Market in Antiquities: Reducing the Harm, Preserving the 
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prices due to rarity.
67
  The Coalition Provisional Authority es-
timated the losses from looting at $12 billion.
68
  Despite Iraqi 
and international laws affirming that ownership of archaeolog-
ical items remain the property of the government and the peo-
ple in the state of origin,
69
 the newfound awareness of how 
much relics could fetch on the international black market left 
an estimated 12,000 unguarded archaeological sites vulnerable 
to illegal diggers who might discover items and sell them with-
out serial numbers or authoritative markings.
70
 
In contrast, the U.S. Department of Defense exhibited a 
disparate level of caretaking when authorities seized and kept 
irreplaceable original documents of the Iraqi government as 
part of an “Iraq Perspectives Project” of the former regime and 
published reports, such as A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
from Saddam’s Senior Leadership
71
 and Saddam and Terror-
ism,
72
 and requested U.S. universities to submit research pro-
                                                                                                                                  
Past, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L. 169, 180-81 (2007); Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 187, 
202; Sumedha Senanayake, Iraq: Antiquities Continue to be Pillaged, De-
stroyed, Radio Free Europe (Oct. 12, 2006), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071983.html. 
67
 Karin E. Borke, Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative 
Response to the Iraqi Antiquities Crisis of 2003, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & 
ENT. L. & POL’Y 381, 387-88 (2003). 
68 DOBBINS, JONES, RUNKLE & MOHANDAS, supra note 2, at 111. 
69 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. 
Res. 61/295, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (affirming that 
“[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to . . . maintain, protect, and have access 
to privacy to their religious and cultural sites. . .”); Patty Gerstenblith, 
Change in the Legal Regime Protecting Cultural Heritage in the Aftermath of 
the War in Iraq, in THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN IRAQ 183-89 
(Peter G Stone & Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly ed., 2008) (noting Iraq’s laws de-
clare that all discovered antiquities become property of the state). 
70 Alexandra Zavis, Ancient Civilization . . . Broken to Pieces, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan 22, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-
antiquities22jan22,1,4177435.story?page=1; Willis, supra note 1, at 228 (not-
ing that thousands of other Iraqi archaeological sites throughout the country 
remained vulnerable to damage and looting). 
71 KEVIN M. WOODS, ET. AL., IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT: A VIEW OF 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FROM SADDAM’S SENIOR LEADERSHIP (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/iraqreport.pdf. 
72 KEVIN M. WOODS & JAMES LACEY, IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT: SADDAM 
AND TERRORISM: EMERGING INSIGHTS FROM CAPTURED IRAQI DOCUMENTS, Vol. 1 
15
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posals.
73
  The 1954 Hague Convention prohibits the taking of 
“archives,” which includes “records” that delineate the activi-
ties and procedures of government and non-agencies,
74
 but in-
ternational law can permit seizing state papers as an interpre-
tation of military necessity when taken in connection to a 
war.
75
  In this instance, the war was over, no ongoing “military 
                                                                                                                                  
(Nov. 2007), available at 
https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/JA
WD/ida-paper-p-4287-Vol-1.pdf.  
73 DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE, BROAD AGENCY 
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. W911NF-08-R-0007, IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT 19 
(2008) (“[i]n the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a vast number of docu-
ments and other media came into the possession of the Department of De-
fense.”); Hugh Eakin, Iraqi Files in U.S.: Plunder or Rescue?, N.Y. TIMES, Ju-
ly 1, 2008, at El (reporting the Hoover Institution held them for preservation 
until they could be returned to Iraq; the five million documents were being 
stored at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University); Letter from Richard 
Sousa, Senior Assoc. Dir. Hoover Inst., to Mark A. Green, President, Soc’y of 
Am. Archivists (June 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.archivists.org/statements/Iraqi%20Records_HooverLetter.pdf 
(emphasizing that the Iraqi government granted permission to hold the doc-
uments and that keeping them at the Hoover Institution was safer than hold-
ing them in Iraq). 
74 Douglas Cox, Archives and Records in Armed Conflict: International 
Law and the Current Debate Over Iraqi Records and Archives, 59 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 1001, 1004-06, 1008 (2010) (calling the archives “an essential part of the 
heritage of any national community”). 
75 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col 1), art. 52, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“military objectives are limited 
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effec-
tive contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage”); Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(g), 36 Stat. 2277. (“it is especially for-
bidden to destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or 
seizure [is] imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”); Soc’y of Am. 
Archivists & Ass’n of Canadian Archivists, SAA/ACA Joint Statement on Ira-
qi Records (Apr. 22, 2008), 
https://www.archivists.org/statements/IraqiRecords.asp (emphasizing that 
“the 1907 Hague IV Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land . . . narrowly restricts the purposes for which a combatant can seize en-
emy records and forbids confiscation of private property, and . . . the 1954 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of 
Armed Conflict . . . states: ‘Each High Contracting Party undertakes to re-
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
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necessity” existed, and the Society of American Archivists ex-
pressed concern about the return of the documents.
76
 
B. Explanations for the Cause of Looting 
The first causal event that led to the looting was the Bush 
Administration’s decision to attack Iraq without United Na-
tions Security Council assent.  From the vista of an undertak-
ing that initiates a chain of events, a primary cause of the an-
tiquity losses can be assessed with bald logic: “If Country A had 
not invaded or destabilized Country B, then no threat to Coun-
try B’s cultural property would have emerged.”
77
  While Bush 
Administration officials alleged that the United Nations was 
ineffective in disarming Iraq of prohibited weapons, those 
weapons ultimately did not exist.
78
  If a war is illegal, the viola-
tor can owe compensatory damages flowing from the armed 
combat.
79
  UN Charter rules prohibit wars without Security 
                                                                                                                                  
turn, at the close of hostilities, to the competent authorities of the territory 
previously occupied, cultural property [including “manuscripts . . and im-
portant collections of books or archives”] which is in its territory, if such 
property has been exported in contravention of the principle laid down in the 
first paragraph.’”). 
76 See Soc’y of Am. Archivists & Ass’n of Canadian Archivists, supra note 
75 (stating that the U.S. military seized millions of pages of state documents 
and that the records should be returned to Iraq). 
77 Matthew D. Thurlow, Protecting Cultural Property in Iraq: How Amer-
ican Military Policy Comports with International Law, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & 
DEV. L.J. 153, 162 (2005); Barbara Lee, Essays From the Role of Law & Poli-
cy: Africa, the Caribbean, and the United States: Preempting Democracy: The 
Bush Administration vs. the World, 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 29, 33 (2005) 
(stating that with the Bush Administration’s decision to topple the Iraqi gov-
ernment, it “unleash[ed] waves of looting and destruction for which it appar-
ently failed to plan”).  
78 Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary 
Standards, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 811, 875-82 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, 
Intelligence Information]; see generally Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections 
Lessons Learned: Evidentiary Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 38 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 295 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Weapon Inspec-
tions]. 
79 Rep. of the Int’d Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 
10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) (stating 
that “every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international 
17
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Council assent or an acceptable justification.
80
  Even if a war is 
legal, the attacking state is obliged to not actively despoil cul-
tural property unless there is a compelling military necessity, 
such as if a military is engaged in combat operations with en-
emy forces and combat gravitates into a vicinity in which cul-
tural property can become collateral damage.  Forces need not 
guard, protect, or prevent the destruction of cultural property if 
doing so requires troops to assume the risk of suffering lethal 
force. 
Invading forces did not destroy cultural property at the 
Iraq National Museum and valuables were not deemed collat-
eral damage, but invading forces might have been obligated to 
devise reasonable efforts to obstruct others from looting or 
damaging cultural property.
81
  This possibility invokes ques-
tions over the “but for” cause of loss, based on the gamut of le-
gal obligations at the time.  The more effective control U.S. mil-
itary forces held over Baghdad, the greater the obligation that 
                                                                                                                                  
responsibility of that state.”); 3 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS LIBRI 
TRES 192-94 (W. Wherwell trans., Cambridge ed. 1853) (1646) (“If the reason 
for the war is unjust, all activities resulting from this war are unjust because 
of their intrinsic injustice . . . The obligation of restitution lies with the per-
sons who perpetrated the war, either by starting it, being rulers themselves, 
or by giving advice to rulers.  This obligation extends to all wrongdoings that 
result from war.”); Bartram S. Brown, Intervention, Self-Determination, De-
mocracy and the Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying Power in Iraq, 11 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 23, 59 (2004) (noting that if an invasion is ille-
gal, liability of intervening powers can extend to the indirect harms caused as 
a result); Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 714 
(2004) (stating that a state acting in violation of jus ad bellum “cannot satisfy 
the proportionality requirement, and satisfaction of this requirement is a 
necessary condition of permissible conduct in war.”).  Following the Gulf War, 
the Security Council established a tribunal with tort law personal injury cat-
egories based on the gravity of injury and individuals and entities filed 2.68 
million claims seeking more than $350 billion in compensation against Iraq.  
John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Bal-
ance of Rights Between Individual Claimants and the Government of Iraq, 10 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 141, 147-50 (2005); Kevin H. Anderson, In-
ternational Law and State Succession: A Solution to the Iraqi Debt Crisis?, 
2005 UTAH L. REV. 401, 433 (2005). 
80 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. (4).  
81
 Birov, supra note 34, at 223 (noting that guarding objects during a war 
is a point of contention). 
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existed to protect locals and their property.
82
  Alternatively, if 
international law required U.S. military forces to confront le-
thal security threats, the military may not have held effective 
control over Baghdad, and security-related imperatives could 
still take priority over thwarting the ruin of cultural property.
83
  
This was the position of General Richard Myers, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who affirmed that the military combat 
operations took precedence over guarding the museum.
84
  At 
the time of the looting, an estimated forty thousand U.S. sol-
diers occupied Baghdad, but according to the U.S. Central 
Command in the Arabian Gulf, the U.S. “didn’t yet have 
enough troops in Baghdad to ‘secure key tactical objectives’—
traffic circles, bridges, power plants, banks, and munitions 
dumps—and also patrol streets.”
85
  Likewise, just three days 
after the looting, Brigadier General Vincent Brooks announced 
that “forces entering Baghdad were involved in ‘very intense 
combat,’” and the museum suffered as a result.
86
  Warfare ex-
                                                          
82 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 30, art. 
5 (an occupier “shall as far as possible support the competent national au-
thorities . . . in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.”); see Ger-
stenblith, supra note 6, at 263-64. 
83 Craig J.S. Forest, The Doctrine of Military Necessity And the Protection 
of Cultural Property During Armed Conflicts, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 177, 178 
(2007). 
84 LAWRENCE ROTHFIELD, ANTIQUITIES UNDER SIEGE: CULTURAL HERITAGE 
PROTECTION AFTER THE IRAQ WAR 20 (2008); Douglas Jehl and Elizabeth 
Becker, A NATION AT WAR: THE LOOTING; Experts’ Pleas to Pentagon 
Didn’t Save Museum, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at B5 (reporting that Profes-
sor McGuire Gibson expressed that he thought there was an understanding 
that the military would safeguard the museum and that it would not stand by 
and watch it be looted, and a senior Pentagon official retorted that the “mili-
tary had never promised the buildings would be safeguarded”).  
85 L. PAUL BREMER III, MY YEAR IN IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A 
FUTURE OF HOPE 14 (2006); John F. Burns, Pillagers Strip Iraqi Museum of 
Its Treasure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2003, at A1 (noting that there were not 
enough available soldiers because there were battles across Baghdad).  From 
the bombing stage and up through the first few weeks of the war, locals ran-
sacked buildings and up to 158 buildings were destroyed.  HIRO, supra note 
64, at 274. 
86 Elise Labott and Jim Clancy, U.S.: We Didn’t Anticipate Looting, CNN 
(Apr. 15, 2003), http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/ 
meast/04/15/sprj.irq.museum.looting/. 
19
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isted because throughout the entire country and during the 
first six weeks following the invasion, 139 U.S. troops and be-
tween 7,600 and 10,800 Iraqis were killed.
87
 
U.S. military officials maintained that obstructing looting 
should not reasonably be recognized as an obligation inherent 
to military planning,
88
 and that the duty to secure as a police 
force was an Iraqi responsibility.
89
  However, acting as a police 
force could be compulsory as soon as an invading force estab-
lishes effective authority and control over the territory, which 
is an event that signifies a legal occupation
90
 and imposes obli-
gations ancillary to that occupation.  U.S. Army Field Manual 
27-10 calls the start of military occupation “a question of fact” 
                                                          
87  See The Toll of War in Iraq: U.S. Casualties and Civilian Deaths, 
NPR, http://www.npr.org/news/specials/tollofwar/tollofwarmain.html (last 
updated Aug. 4, 2009) (placing U.S. troop fatalities in March 2003 at 65 and 
in April 2003 at 74); SPENCER C. TUCKER, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MIDDLE EAST 
WARS: THE UNITED STATES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ 
CONFLICTS 266 (2010) (referencing several sources of credible Iraqi death toll 
figures for the first phase of operations, which was from Mar. 19, 2003 to Apr. 
30, 2003). 
88 Jehl & Becker, supra note 84, at B5 (Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
remarking “To try to pass off the fact of that unfortunate activity [of looting] 
to a deficit in the war plan strikes me as a stretch.”). 
89 Edmund L. Andrews, Iraqi Officials Say Looting of Ancient Sites Con-
tinues Despite Pleas to U.S. Troops for Help, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at 
A14 (Lt. Col. Daniel O’Donoahue remarked “We don’t have anywhere enough 
marines to police every fixed site in the country . . . Our view is that if it’s a 
fixed site, it’s primarily an Iraqi responsibility.”).  Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks 
stated “At no time do we really see becoming a police force.”  US Shows Off 
New Card Trick, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 200), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/11/iraq3. 
90 Convention IV, supra note 25, art. 42 (“[T]erritory is considered occu-
pied when it is . . . placed under the authority of the hostile army.”); 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 27, ¶ 351 (reiterating art. 42 of the 
1907 Convention and stating that legal occupation exists in regions where 
“authority has been established and can be exercised.”); Naomi Burke, A 
Change in Perspective: Looking at Occupation Through the Lens of the Law of 
Treaties, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 103, 125-28 (2008)(noting the extension 
of treaty occupations to “occupied” territories); Noam Lubell, Challenges in 
Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV RED CROSS 737, 
740 (2005) (emphasizing that international conventions have defined “occu-
pation” in terms of whether there is an effective authority and control over a 
territory). 
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and affirms that “no proclamation of military occupation is 
necessary.”
91
 
It does not appear that massive looting occurred before 
U.S. officials claimed Baghdad was secure, but rather ensued 
after a heavily armed foreign military force effectively disband-
ed the domestic military and police security that presumably 
would have otherwise prevented the lawlessness.  This demobi-
lization became an official and legal result one month later 
when all government employees associated with the former re-
gime were banned from government service pursuant to Coali-
tion Provisional Authority Order No. 1.92  However, pandemo-
nium began at the time of the looting, according to Professor 
Asli Ǘ. Bali, because “it became apparent to the Iraqi people 
that law and order had dissolved and that no one exercised ef-
fective control, [which led to the] the emergence of self-help and 
self-defense systems.”
93
  Others believed that a duty to protect 
                                                          
91 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 27, ¶¶ 355, 357. 
92 Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 1, De-Ba’athification of Ira-
qi Society, CPA/ORD/1, May 16, 2003, available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-
Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf.  Order 1 removed 15,000 to 30,000 
members from government positions.  Purge of Saddam Loyalists, BBC, May 
16, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3033919.stm; Adam Roberts, 
Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human 
Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L., 580, 614 (2006)(calling Order 1 much criticized).  
Bremer’s CPA Order 1 ultimately pushed 140,000 Iraqis out of their jobs, but 
it was reversed years later.  Amit R. Paley & Joshua Partlow, Iraq’s New Law 
on Ex-Baathists Could Bring Another Purge, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012203538_pf.html. 
93 Asli Ǘ. Bậli, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of 
Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 431, 452 (2005); Kristin E. Pe-
tersen, Cultural Apocalypse Now: The Loss of the Iraq Museum and a New 
Proposal for the Wartime Protection of Museums, 16 MINN. J. INT’L L. 163, 
183 (2007).  As for providing security after police and military were disband-
ed, armed gangs roamed the streets searching for bounty.  HIRO, supra note 
64, at 314.  By some accounts, lawlessness was more serious a year into the 
occupation.  IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND 
BEYOND 62 (Jeremy Brecher, Jill Cutler, Brendan Smith, eds., 2005); Richard 
Norton-Taylor, Violence Blamed on US Decision to Disband Iraq Army, 
GUARDIAN, Apr. 7, 2004, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/07/iraq.usa2 (noting that further 
21
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the museum existed because the military unquestionably held 
control over Baghdad on April 9, 2003, with most of the looting 
occurring over the next two days.
94
  Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld might agree with this assessment because locals 
were effectively free of the previous regime.  On April 12, 2003, 
after the looting and vandalism appeared in global new 
sources, Rumsfeld explained “Freedom’s untidy, and free peo-
ple are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad 
things . . . Stuff happens.”
95
 
There was also an assortment of news reports contending 
that U.S. troops were available in varying capacities. Many 
Iraqis denounced U.S. troops for not securing the museum
96
 
                                                                                                                                  
violence broke “when the US decided to disband the Iraqi army” and that this 
decision was in opposition to the British proposal to negotiate with the mili-
tary and allow them to maintain law and order); Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization, Crop, Food Supply, and Nutrition Assessment Mission to Iraq 
(Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/j0465e/j0465e00.HTM#33 
(noting the high level of food insecurity).  If occupying forces cannot be count-
ed on for protection, locals will likely continue to take advantage of the situa-
tion.  JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE 
RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 147, 157-
58 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006). 
94 Amy E. Miller, The Looting of Iraqi Art: Occupiers and Collectors Turn 
away Leisurely from the Disaster, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 49, 70 (2005) 
(noting that there was definitely military control and also stating that the 
“bulk of the looting and destruction of the National Museum and Library of 
Iraq occurred on Thursday, April 10, 2003, and Friday, April 11, 2003.”); See 
Contra Dick Jackson, Cultural Property Protection in Stability operations, 
2008 ARMY L. 47, 51 (2008) (Colonel writing that “there is still considerable 
controversy to this day about when U.S. forces established effective control 
over the area of Baghdad near the museum which would trigger the protec-
tion of an occupying force”). 
95 Sean Loughlin, Rumsfeld on Looting in Iraq: ‘Stuff Happens,’ CNN, 
Apr. 12, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/04/11/sprj.irq.pentagon/; See also 
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Beyond Wealth: Stories of Art, War, and Greed, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1100 (2008); Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 195-96. 
96 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 190; Sasha P. Paroff, Another Victim of 
the War in Iraq: The Looting of the National Museum in Baghdad and the In-
adequacies of International Protection of Cultural Property, 53 EMORY L.J. 
2021, 2046 (2004) (stating that the museum’s deputy director explained that 
“the Americans were supposed to protect the museum.  If they had just one 
tank and two soldiers nothing like this would have happened.”); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, Coalition Forces Must Stop Iraqi Looting, Apr. 12, 2003 
available at http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2003/04/11/coalition-forces-must-
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
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especially after locals requested troops to prevent future loot-
ing.
97
  The U.S. military could have issued an order to guard 
the museum. By some accounts, the U.S. actually did issue that 
directive,
98
 but what precisely was directed is not conspicu-
ous.
99
  One account reported that a tank and five marines were 
present at the National Museum on Thursday, April 10, and af-
ter U.S. forces fired a few shots, potential vandals departed,
100
 
but looters later returned and broke into the museum.
101
  An-
                                                                                                                                  
stop-iraqi-looting (“International law requires that occupying powers must 
ensure the safety of the civilian population in areas under their control.”); 
UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE SAFETY AND 
SECURITY OF UN PERSONNEL IN IRAQ 5-6 (Oct. 20, 2003), 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/safety-security-un-personnel-iraq.pdf (noting 
that well after there was an obligation to provide security, the U.N. head-
quarters was bombed in Iraq and the US military did not provide security to 
the headquarters either even though they were obligation to do so). 
97 See Burns, supra note 85, at A1 (reporting that Iraqi Archaeologist 
Raid Abdul Ridhar Muhammad “asked them [U.S. military troops] to bring 
their tank inside the museum grounds . . . [b]ut they refused and left.”); See 
also Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 236-37; See Fiachra Gibbons, Experts 
Mourn the Lion of Nimrud, Looted as Troops Stood By, THE GUARDIAN,  
Apr. 30, 2003, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/ 
apr/30/internationaleducationnews.arts (explaining that Dr Donny George, a 
curator at the Baghdad museum, expressed: “One of our staff who lived in the 
museum compound went to an American tank and pleaded with them, begged 
in fact, for them to come in front of the museum to keep it safe . . . But he was 
told they had no orders to do so.”); Naomi Klein, Baghdad Year Zero: Pillag-
ing Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia, HARPERS, Sept. 2004 (noting that Sa-
bah Asaad, managing director of a refrigerator factory near Baghdad, re-
marked that he went to Army soldiers for help to remove looters and the 
officer remarked: “Sorry, we can’t do anything, we need an order from Presi-
dent Bush.”). 
98 ROTHFIELD, supra note 84, at 20 (reporting that Secretary of State 
Powell stated that CENTCOM did instruct troops to protect museums); 
Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 236-37 (stating that the U.S. military was told to 
protect the looted museum).  In July 2003, Pentagon Attorney Major Enge 
explained: “Once it becomes evident that cultural sites or museums are being 
targeted by looters, a Ground Forces Component Commander may issue or-
der to protect these sites.”  Thurlow, supra note 77, at 174. 
99 Burns, supra note 85, at A1 (reporting that Mohsen Hassan, the depu-
ty curator, had received mixed signals from the US military command about 
the degree of protection that would be provided). 
100 Id.; see also Thurlow, supra note 77, at 176-77. 
101 Thurlow, supra note 77, at 177. 
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other report stated that a U.S. tank accidentally blew a hole in 
a portion of the museum and marauders emerged.
102
  There 
were also contradictory reports of whether U.S. military per-
sonnel encouraged vandalism or engaged in misconduct related 
to the looting.
103
 
Irrespective of questions over the immediate cause of the 
destruction and whether it would have been sensible to initiate 
efforts to protect the museum, perhaps what is most distress-
ing is the fact that for five thousand years and with numerous 
governing factions, these artifacts remained intact; Iraqis did 
not have such disrespect for their own country or history.  
Keeping these artifacts for thousands of years suggests that 
the Iraqi people (and even Hussein’s regime) provided exem-
plary protection for their cultural heritage.
104
 But, concomitant 
                                                          
102 Iraq’s Insurgency, Funded by Treasure, ABC NEWS, Apr. 11, 2006, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/IraqCoverage/story?id=1832620&page=1. 
103 Col. Dick Jackson explained that “[t]here are no allegations that U.S. 
Armed Forces participated in looting,” and “General Order Number 1 specifi-
cally prohibits such conduct.”  Jackson, supra note 94, at 51.  Some media re-
ports contended that US military troops encouraged and actively vandalized 
and destroyed artifacts and ancient ruins.  Ed Vulliamy, Troops ‘Vandalize’ 
Ancient City of Ur, THE GUARDIAN, May 18, 2003, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/18/internationaleducationnews.
iraq.  An Iraqi doctor explained: “I saw American soldiers standing by, taking 
photographs, cheering them on.”  Patrick Cockburn, The Path to Peace: Allies 
Face a Tough Battle to Bring Normality, THE INDEPENDENT, June 25, 2003, 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168-
general/36815.html?tmpl=component.  As the looting erupted, isolated main-
stream media reports began documenting that the looting and chaos was be-
ing encouraged by the US military, as vandals gutted “every important public 
institution in the city,” including schools, libraries, hospitals, museums and 
electric plants.  IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 93, at 60-61; See also 
HIRO, supra note 64, at 258; Daniel Bodanky, Establishing the Rule of Law, 
33 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 119, 121 (2004).  Whether they were taken at the 
time of the looting or acquired at some time during the occupation, U.S. mili-
tary personnel smuggled artifacts into the U.S.  U.S. Dept. of Homeland Se-
curity, ICE Returns Saddam Hussein Ceremonial Sword to Republic of Iraq, 
July 29, 2013, 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1307/130729washingtondc2.htm (noting a 
sword that was sold by the Amoskeag Auction Company in Manchester, N.H., 
on January 7, 2012 for $15,000). 
104
 Marion Forsyth, Casualties of War: The Destruction of Iraq’s Cultural 
Heritage as a Result of U.S. Action During and After the 1991 Gulf War, 14 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
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with military announcements of Baghdad being secure, public 
facilities, including the National Museum, began to be de-
stroyed.  Even if there were no bombings of the enumerated 
historical, cultural, or archaeological sites that would violate 
international law,
105
 the military occupation’s indifference to 
the looting of the museum in Baghdad precipitated a similar 
outcome to historical wars in which invading forces destroyed 
cultural heritage.
106
  The Bush Administration received criti-
cism throughout the world for failing to secure the museum,
107
 
with Professor O’Connell writing that “U.S. negligence in Iraq 
has truly resulted in a crisis surrounding Iraqi cultural proper-
ty.  Only a few of the high-value, high-quality pieces looted 
from Iraq had been recovered five years after the invasion.”
108
 
C. Warnings Made Looting More Foreseeable 
A routine examination of the duty of care in tort law fre-
quently considers the foreseeability of acts that can cause 
harm.  In the case of a possible duty to protect during an effec-
tive occupation, this inquiry might probe the reasonable expec-
                                                                                                                                  
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 73, 75-77 (2004); Miller, supra note 94, at 64 
(Hussein placed restrict regulations on protecting Iraq’s artifacts). 
105 Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 305-06. 
106 KNUTH, supra note 60, at 201-20. 
107 Gerstenblith, supra note 36, at 692 (noting that the U.S. “failure to 
protect and to plan to protect these cultural institutions was widely con-
demned.”); Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake 
of Operation Iraqi “Freedom,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2295, 2297-98 (2007) (stating 
that many experts placed responsibility for failing to prevent looting and im-
peding humanitarian assistance directly on Coalition Forces); See also Sand-
holtz, supra note 38, at 189-93; Thurlow, supra note 77, at 177-78; Joshua M. 
Zelig, Recovering Iraq’s Cultural Property: What Can Be Done to Prevent Illic-
it Trafficking, 31 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 289, 311 (2005) (reporting that The 
China Daily opined: “It is immoral for the United States to destroy Iraq’s cul-
ture while trying to rebuild the country economically and politically. The self-
proclaimed liberators’ cannot escape worldwide criticism at a time when 
UNESCO is launching a strong campaign across the world to protect endan-
gered cultural heritages.”); Cohan, supra note 9, at 63 (“The entire interna-
tional community has a common interest in protecting cultural property.”); 
Jehl & Becker, supra note 84, at B5. 
108 O’Connell, supra note 95, at 1101. 
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tations of those directing war efforts by raising the foreseeabil-
ity of Iraqi actions under the circumstances.  The looting of rel-
ics may be a foreseeable event following an invasion of another 
country because destruction of edifices and infrastructure can 
make valuable items easier to pilfer.  Moreover, displacement 
of the former regime (that imposed law and order) might re-
duce the thief’s perceived risk of anticipated penalty for engag-
ing in criminal activity.  Common knowledge of the elevated 
importance of Iraq’s ancient history,
109
 the expectation of loot-
ing based on the value of the treasures,
110
 recent regional ex-
amples of pilferage during warfare,
111
 and vulnerable anteced-
ing conditions
112
 also generated specific, foreseeable warnings. 
In January 2003, Nancy C. Wilkie, president of the Ar-
chaeological Institute of America (AIA), punctuated the menace 
that war can inflict on cultural institutions, such as the Iraq 
National Museum, and explained that “AIA members and col-
leagues are already petitioning the U.S. government to exercise 
caution and providing adequate information about the location 
                                                          
109 Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 273-75. 
110 See Priscilla Singer, Note, The New American Approach to Cultural 
Heritage Protection: Granting Foreign Aid for Iraqi Cultural Heritage, 11 
CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. 1, at 16 (2011) (The National Museum staff rec-
ognized threats and took measures to safeguard the museum, including by 
having teams available to defend the museum and by moving thousands of 
items that could easily be stolen into storage areas). Convention for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property, supra note 30, art. 4. (These were arguably rea-
sonable measures to adhere to obligations under the Hague Convention “to 
prepare in time of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated 
within their own territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed con-
flict.”)   
111 Recent regional examples that should have heightened the expecta-
tion of pilferage during warfare include thefts at the Kabul Museum during 
the Soviet-U.S. proxy war in Afghanistan during the 1980s, looting and de-
struction during the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s, and pillaging surround-
ing the Gulf War in 1991. See Cohan, supra note 9, at 40-41; see also Jehl & 
Becker, supra note 84, at B5. 
112 U.S. officials might have cognized that it was more difficult for Iraqi 
authorities to safeguard cultural heritage, because of the destruction caused 
during the 1991 Gulf War and the post-war sanction regime shorn funding 
for archaeological operations and preservation programs. see Forsyth, supra 
note 104, at 78-80. 
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of ancient sites to help protect them should a conflict occur.”
113
  
Archaeologists provided the U.S. government with coordinates 
of crucial locations that needed to be secured due to the pro-
spect of looting, and the Iraq National Museum was at the top 
of the list.
114
  A Pentagon memo, dated March 26, 2003, one 
week into the invasion and two weeks prior to the looting, rec-
ognized that a plan was required to “prevent further damage, 
destruction, and/or pilferage [of Baghdad’s museum, which is] . 
. . one of the largest archaeological museums in the world.”
115
  
Concerned experts also imparted immediate notifications.  
On April 9, three days prior to the start of the looting, the 
AIA provided warning letters to the White House, the Depart-
ment of Defense, and Department of State, urging “upon the 
Coalition forces to provide immediate security, where neces-
sary, for museums and major archaeological sites; to make pub-
lic statements condemning the looting of sites and museums 
and warning that cultural objects removed from Iraq are stolen 
property; and, where necessary, to make appropriate shows of 
                                                          
113 Nancy C. Wilkie, From the President: In the Shadow of War, 56 
ARCHAEOLOGY ARCHIVE 1, 2003. 
114 See Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 286-287  (The U.S. Department of 
State received warnings of the damage that could be inflicted on the Iraq Na-
tional Museum and was apprised that it was the paramount archaeological 
site in the country.);  Alfred Lubrano, U.S., Scholars Spar on Looting of Arti-
facts, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 17, 2003, at A01 (An archaeologist at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania explained that if it were possible to “simultaneously ex-
plode the National Gallery, the Library of Congress, the cultural institutions 
of Philadelphia, Boston, and New York, then add the Louvre and the British 
Museum, that might describe the magnitude of loss to world culture and an-
cient scholarship that the looting wrought.”), available at 
http://articles.philly.com/2003-04-17/news/25476784_1_baghdad-museum-
looting-pentagon;. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, supra note 75, art. 27 (The 1907 Hague Regulations mandate that the 
defending state designate the cultural location with “distinctive and visible 
signs.”); In this case, it would seem less necessary to mark the location and 
more unreasonable to remove cultural treasures from their routine location 
because the situs was known around the world.  Andrew Lawler, Saving 
Iraq’s Treasures, SMITHSONIAN MAG., (June 2003), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/saving-iraqs-treasures-
83214090/?no-ist (noting that for over eighty years these items were held in 
the National Museum in Baghdad). 
115 Willis, supra note 1, at 225. 
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force to stop looting.”
116
  However, when members of the press 
queried Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld over whether scholars 
notified of potential peril to the museum, his reply was, “not to 
my knowledge.”
117
  Alternatively, General Meyers did have a 
recollection and remarked: “We did get advice on archaeological 
sites around Baghdad and in fact I think it was the Archaeolog-
ical—American Archaeological Association—I believe that’s the 
correct title—wrote the Secretary some concerns.”
118
  While the 
rest of the world reacted to the loss of the archeological treas-
ures amid pictures of the rubble, a bewildered Secretary of De-
fense Rumsfeld postulated:  “My goodness, were there that 
many vases?  Is it possible that there were that many vases in 
                                                          
116 Letter from Jane Waldbaum, President, Archaeological Institute of 
America, to Officials in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, 
the White House, and the military, (Apr. 9, 2003), (on file at 
http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/home/Letter04-09.pdf); see Jehl & Becker, 
supra note 84, at B5 (reporting that “[r]epresentatives of the American Coun-
cil for Cultural Policy . . . met with Defense and State Department officials in 
the months before the war” and that e-mail messages were also sent in the 
days prior to the attack). 
117 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 196-97. 
118 Id. at 197-98 (“Ashton Hawkins, president of the non-profit American 
Council for Cultural Policy, wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, 
and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and officials in other agen-
cies . . . [and] asked what measures the U.S. invading forces would take to 
protect Iraq’s antiquities from damage or destruction. He received no re-
sponse.” Hawkins and Maxwell L. Anderson, president of the American Asso-
ciation of Museum Directors, also informed of the issue in a Washington Post 
article on November 29, 2002. Hawkins and others met with Pentagon offi-
cials on January 29, 2003 and informed of important locations to protect and 
the Pentagon’s own Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
apparently identified the Iraqi National Museum and the national bank as 
the top two targets for looters); see also Open Declaration on Cultural Herit-
age at Risk in Iraq, AIA NEWS, Mar. 19, 2003, available at 
http://www.archaeological.org/news/advocacy/134 (stating the U.N. and in-
ternational authorities warning that cultural heritage was in danger “The 
extraordinary global significance of the monuments, museums, and archaeo-
logical sites of Iraq (ancient Mesopotamia) imposes an obligation on all peo-
ples and governments to protect them. In any military conflict that heritage 
is put at risk, and it appears now to be in grave danger.”); Terry Frieden, Ira-
qi Antiquity Seized at U.S. Airport, CNN (Apr. 20, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/04/23/sprj.nilaw.antiquities/index.html?iref=
mpstoryview; Interpol Hunts Stolen Iraqi Art, CNN (Apr. 18, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/04/18/sprj.nilaw.artifacts.interpol/. 
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the whole country?”
119
 
In terms of tort law causation, one can argue that Iraqi 
looters were the direct intervening cause of the damage to the 
museum.
120
  Therefore, if U.S. authorities unreasonably ne-
glected to heed warnings and failed to secure the museum, 
perhaps these inadequacies were of secondary significance.  
However, it might have been logical to forecast that the aver-
age Iraqi citizen would be needy in a country with a low per 
capita income and may not have had a viable means of earning 
money.
121
  This would particularly be the case after cities were 
bombed, infrastructure became decrepit, normal daily sched-
ules and commercial activities halted, and futures made inde-
terminate with an occupying military force in the country.  
Perhaps Pentagon announcements that the city was secured ef-
fectively signaled that there was no competing authority capa-
ble of wielding force and no domestic government facilities to 
distribute humanitarian assistance to the people.  The adversi-
ty and economic catastrophe was globally observed as the me-
dia displayed American troops making goodwill deliveries of 
bulk quantities of food.
122
 In addition, two weeks before the 
                                                          
119 O’Connell, supra note 95, at 1100 (citing comment of Apr. 12, 2003). 
120 See Frank Rich, And Now, ‘Operation Iraqil Looting,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
27, 2003 (reporting that an U.S. official stated, “I don’t think that anyone an-
ticipated that the riches of Iraq would be looted by the Iraqi people” and that 
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer called the looting “a reaction to oppression.”); 
U.S.: We Didn’t Anticipate Looting, supra note 86 (U.S. military officials ex-
plaining that they failed “to anticipate Iraq’s cultural riches would be looted 
by its own people.”); Robert Fisk, A Civilization Torn to Pieces, THE 
INDEPENDENT Apr. 13, 2003, available at 
https://www.commondreams.org/views03/0413-06.htm (“The Iraqis did it.  
They did it to their own history.”). 
121 Cohan, supra note 9, at 8, 10. 
122 David Glazier, Introduction, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-2 
(2009) (pointing out that two days before the invasion Bush addressed the 
nation and stated that a U.S. attack “will deliver the food and medicine you 
need” and liberate the country to be “prosperous and free,” but instead “it has 
been the Iraqi people who have largely borne the costs” of the Bush Admin-
istration’s war); Survey Shows High Prevalence of Food Insecurity in Iraq, 
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (Sept. 28, 2004), http://www.wfp.org/news/news-
release/survey-shows-high-prevalence-food-insecurity-iraq (noting that in 
September 2004, the United Nations World Food Program undertook an in-
29
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looting, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1472 to sum-
mon the international community to assist in resolving the 
humanitarian crisis.
123
  Comparatively, John Cohan points out 
that “[d]uring the Great Depression in the United States, there 
was widespread subsistence looting of prehistoric sites” and 
looters were selling the items to buy food.
124
  It is unlikely that 
starving Americans perpetrated the thefts because they were 
bent on desolating public property, but so acted with an osten-
sible motive of heedfulness for survival.  Perhaps the impetus 
for action was similar for Iraqis. 
IV. SOVEREIGN AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES 
A. The Scenario 
With the aforementioned events surrounding the looting 
and the fact that Iraq does have a right to reacquire pilfered 
                                                                                                                                  
vestigation and found that 6.5 million Iraqis, or 25% of the population, “re-
main highly dependent on [government] food rations.”). 
123 S.C. Res. 1472, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1472 (Mar. 28, 2003); HIRO, 
supra note 64, at 192-94. (Al Jazeera and a dozen other channels “provided 
straight news that in many ways gave their viewers a more rounded pic-
ture—from the inside—than the Anglo-American networks did.  While the 
Anglo-American networks tended to show Allied medics treating injured Iraqi 
civilians tenderly while their armed colleagues handed out drinking-water 
cans to thirsty Iraqi POWs, the Arab media, while airing the briefings and 
sound bites coming from London, Washington, and Doha . . . also showed the . 
. . charred Iraqi bodies, [corpses, blood-soaked pavements, blown-out brains, 
screaming infants and wailing women] . . . grievously wounded civilians . . . 
[children wounded by US cluster bombs,] dead Allied troops and injured Iraqi 
soldiers, hospitals choked with wounded and burnt Iraqis.  Away from the 
battle zone, the Arab networks showed Iraqi suffering, humiliation, and panic 
– distraught families held up at Anglo-American military checkpoints, hood-
ed Iraqi POWs, thousands of fleeing the capital, and civilians, deprived of 
food and water, driven to begging or looting.”).   
124 See Cohan, supra note 9, at 8. The poverty continued in the following 
weeks. See also Stan Crock, Commentary: How the U.S. Can Keep Iraq from 
Unraveling, BUS. WK., June 2, 2003, at 28 (“Peace is turning out to be hell for 
average Iraqis. Electricity is still out in many parts of Baghdad.  Looting is 
rampant, as thieves fill trucks with everything from scrap wood to crates of 
weapons.  The threat of carjacking and kidnapping keeps people locked inside 
their houses. Drinking water is dicey.  Many can’t return to work, while chil-
dren can’t attend school.”). 
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antiquities under international and domestic law, the Iraqi In-
terior Ministry’s Economic Crimes Department’s investigation 
into the acts of 39 countries to facilitate the return of stolen ar-
tifacts
125
 is a prudent step.  If items have not been discovered 
or were desecrated, however, an alternative query is whether 
damage remedies could be available against states or officials 
whose malfeasance or misfeasance led to the looting and de-
struction.  Both the compulsion of a reluctant state to procure 
the return of an item and the attainment of damage remedies 
would likely require an assessment of sovereign and official 
immunities. 
Pursuant to the comity-based act of state doctrine, the 
courts in one state will not question another state’s public 
acts.
126
  However, exceptions have developed. In the U.S., the 
1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) permitted the 
revocation of sovereign immunity from federal and state court 
jurisdiction when “rights in property taken in violation of in-
ternational law are in issue.”
127
  In Republic of Austria et al. v. 
Altmann, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether Altmann 
could sue Austria in federal court under section 2 of the FSIA, 
which permits federal civil “claim[s] for relief in personam with 
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immuni-
ty.”
128
  Altmann sought to recover paintings that were expro-
priated from her uncle in 1938 during World War II and were 
                                                          
125 See Kislova, supra note 5. International treaty obligations (as consid-
ered in Part II) suggest that equitable remedies are warranted to procure the 
return of identified items located in a foreign jurisdiction. 
126 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (“The 
act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this 
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign 
sovereign power committed within its own territory”); See also Underhill v. 
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 (1987) (“Under international law, 
a state or state instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of another state, except with respect to claims arising out of activities of the 
kind that may be carried out by private persons.”). 
127 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).  If sovereign immunity applies, the typi-
cal procedure involves the state-defendant making a special appearance in 
U.S. courts and dismissing the case. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 126.  
128 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
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presently held and displayed at the Austrian National Gal-
lery.
129
  Austria purchased the paintings in 1941, but in 1948, 
museum authorities falsely represented that the museum re-
ceived valid title to the paintings through bequeath. Premised 
on these facts, the U.S. Supreme Court decided it was the judi-
ciary’s role to determine whether sovereign immunity should 
apply to Austria in U.S. courts and whether the 1976 FSIA 
would apply retroactively.
130
  The Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court’s decision that pierced sovereign immunity and al-
lowed the case to proceed in U.S. courts.
131
  The Supreme 
Court’s decision led both parties to assent to arbitration in 
Austria.  In January 2006, the arbitration panel awarded Alt-
mann with ownership of five paintings that were stolen in 
1938.
132
 
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision to pierce sovereign 
immunity and the arbitration panel’s decision to order Austria 
to return the paintings, it could be reasonable to extrapolate 
                                                          
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 677, 679, 682, 702; 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012) (“Claims of foreign 
states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United 
States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this 
chapter.”); See also Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t 
of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), re-
printed in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984–85 (1952) (noting also that the “restrictive 
theory” of sovereign immunity started in 1952 and granted sovereign immun-
ity to all public acts, but not private acts).  With respect to the choice of a na-
tional forum, one might presume that the locus of the property and the situs 
of the wrong would provide a more appropriate forum.  The respondent did 
initially seek, but was effectively hindered from attaining a remedy in Aus-
trian courts.  See Altmann, supra note 128, at 684-85, (noting that respond-
ent sought to recover the paintings in Austrian courts but costs to proceed 
were specially set at $350,000, but the Austrian Government appealed the 
partial waiver, and respondent dismissed the suit); Republic of Austria v. 
Altmann, 541 U.S. at 706 (Breyer, J., concurring) (The lower federal court did 
not address “any legal determination about the merits of Austrian legal pro-
cedures” but the sole issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was retroactivity of 
the FSIA’s “expropriation exception.”).   
131 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965, 974 (9th Cir. 
2002); Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 
2001). 
132 William Grimes, Maria Altmann, Pursuer of Family’s Stolen Paint-
ings, Dies at 94, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at B19. 
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the circumstance to a hypothetical damage remedy.
133
  The tri-
bunal found that Altmann did have a legal right to the paint-
ings because of the previous private ownership, just as, via do-
mestic and international laws, the Iraqi public is the legal 
owner of artifacts that went missing during the 2003 war and 
occupation.  The question is how a state, or perhaps even gov-
ernment officials, could be liable for potentially wrongful acts 
that set the looting in motion or permitted the thefts and de-
struction to transpire.   
The legal deduction espoused requires assessing the perti-
nent factual chronology leading to the 2003 invasion and im-
munities at the international level (section B) and the domestic 
level (section C).  Head of state immunity is distinguishable 
from sovereign immunity, but both are often treated in con-
junction because of the assumption that the top official’s state 
acts are immune from actions brought by other states.
134
 There 
is, however, a separation in the case of war crimes tribunals 
and crimes against humanity because leaders can be held re-
sponsible for illicit acts regarding official immunity.  This as-
sumption is also employed in the case at hand: Section B con-
siders how official immunity is pierced at the international 
level for grave crimes against humanity and war crimes and 
                                                          
133 For example, if the Austrian National Gallery certifiably possessed 
the paintings under the same circumstances and those paintings later went 
missing, perhaps a damage claim could have been available for the market 
value of the paintings.  If a damage claim would have been available against 
Austria, then Austria’s recourse, based on the original transaction (rather 
than the cause of the later uncanny disappearance), would have been against 
the thieves who stole the art during World War II, intermediaries who sold 
the art to Austria, or Austrian officials who might have knowingly been in-
volved in an illegal transaction or representation of fraud in title; all of whom 
would have been unavailable or without adequate funds, which means that 
without traceability of proceeds the Austrian taxpayer would assume the 
loss.  However, even under the facts as presented, if Austrian funds were 
used to purchase the paintings and the Austrian National Gallery lost title 
and possession of the paintings, this prohibits the ability to display or sell the 
paintings and the Austrian taxpayer loses value. 
134 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Head-of-State Immunity—Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act—Suggestion by the Department of State, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 
528, 529-30 (1994). 
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extrapolates how immunity might be pierced for civil losses 
that flow from these wrongs. 
B. The Substantive Claim Under International Level 
1. Crimes Against Humanity 
After the Cold War ended, the international community 
developed institutions that elevated human rights and enforced 
rules that criminalized state-sponsored wrongs.
135
  The devel-
opments pierced official immunities, held a significant number 
of top officials criminally responsible, and placed many other 
leaders under threat of prosecution.
136
  However, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) also articulated principles that 
upheld sovereign prerogative and official immunity at the do-
mestic level. 
In the ICJ Arrest Warrant case, Belgium, pursuant to its 
incorporation of Geneva Convention offenses and crimes 
against humanity into domestic law, issued an arrest warrant 
in April 2000 against an incumbent minister of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) for inciting racial hatred in 
speeches in the DRC in 1998.
137
  The ICJ ruled that a state is-
suing a criminal arrest warrant against a foreign minister for 
official acts violates international law because it does not re-
spect the international law doctrine of inviolability of the pub-
lic minister.
138
  The decision articulates that this immunity 
                                                          
135 LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 (1990); Gregory H. Fox, Interna-
tionalizing National Politics: Lessons for International Organizations, 13 
WIDENER L. REV. 265, 267 (2007). 
136 More leaders are under the shadow of prosecution than ever before. 
See generally Rutei Teitel, Perspectives on Transnational Justice: Collective 
Memory, Command Responsibility, and the Political Psychology of Leader-
ship: The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 837, 837 (2005); see also Jamie O’Connell, Gambling with the Psy-
che: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?, 46 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 295, 295-96 (2005). 
137 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Re-
public of the Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J ¶¶ 48, 54 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter 
Congo v. Belgium]. 
138 Id. ¶¶ 48, 54 (“the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of 
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from civil and criminal jurisdiction applies to top government 
officials, such as the “Head of Government and Minister of For-
eign Affairs,” for acts committed while in office as a principle of 
customary international law.
139
  In addition to the fact that this 
was a contentious dispute (rather than an advisory opinion),
140
 
Congo acknowledged that the immunity was limited to foreign 
unilateral assertions of jurisdiction.
141
  Indeed, if collective as-
sent exists among states to establish an international tribunal, 
the international tribunal could pierce the official immunity of 
the heads of state.
142
 
For example, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a 
                                                                                                                                  
the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, and its international circulation, consti-
tuted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that they failed to respect the immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed under in-
ternational law”). 
139 Id. ¶¶ 51, 54.  The Court emphasized that the decision was rendered 
on the issue of immunity from criminal process for acts perpetrated by an in-
cumbent minister while in office.  Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 21.  The facts in contention 
did not involve civil liability for grave crimes against humanity perpetrated 
outside the leader’s home sovereign jurisdiction.  The ICJ also recognized 
that the head of state immunity applied to restrict the civil and criminal ju-
risdiction of other states as a principle of customary international law.  Id. ¶¶ 
51, 54; See also ROGER O’KEEFE, CHRISTIAN J. TAMS & ANTONIOS 
TZANAKOPOULOS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON JURISDICTIONAL 
IMMUNITIES 88 (2013) (distinguishing the ICJ decision in the Arrest Warrant 
case and stating that “it is difficult to see how the rationale for and resultant 
nature of the immunity of the relevant State officers from foreign civil pro-
ceedings could be any different.”). 
140 Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶¶ 24, 27 (noting that both parties 
agreed that there was a contentious case when Congo filed the request to the 
ICJ and that the case was covered by their agreement to accept the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the ICJ statute).  In a contentious dispute, the decision is 
effectively limited to the facts of the case. 
141 Id. ¶ 48 (Congo admitting that “immunity does not mean impunity” 
because even if immunity barred “prosecution before a specific court or over a 
specific period [that] does not mean that the same prosecution cannot be 
brought, if appropriate, before another court which is not bound by that im-
munity, or at another time when the immunity need no longer be taken into 
account.”). 
142
 Id. ¶ 61 (recognizing that international criminal tribunals can assert 
jurisdiction over heads of state for crimes against humanity). 
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permanent international tribunal with a mission to “guarantee 
lasting respect for . . . the enforcement of international justice” 
by asserting jurisdiction over only “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.”
143
  Over 
the past several years, the ICC has instituted investigations 
and criminal proceedings against several African leaders.
144
  
The most recent controversy unfolded in December 2013 when 
the ICC issued an arrest warrant for incumbent Sudanese 
President Omar Al-Bashir. 
145
 Al-Bashir would not leave Sudan 
so to avoid possible execution of that warrant.
146
  Kenya also 
issued an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir, but the warrant was 
reportedly issued on behalf of the African Union.  The African 
Union opposed the ICC’s arrest warrant and views the ICC’s 
Western state membership as a form of neo-colonialism.
147
  
This contention of neo-colonialism invokes a common complaint 
about international tribunals, which is that state power can po-
liticize decisions and pierce official immunity to prosecute se-
lect leaders, while leaders in strong states (that impel the pros-
ecutions) could be immune from liability for similar 
injustices.
148
 
                                                          
143
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl, art. 5, July 
17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1003 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf 
144 International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, [No date], 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_MENUS/ICC/SITUATIONS%20AND%20CASES/ 
Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx. 
145 Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for 
Sudan’s Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/world/africa/05court.html?ref=omarhassa
nalbashir&_r=0.  
146 Sudanese President to Skip Mandela Funeral Amid ICC Arrest Fears: 
Report, SUDAN TRIB., Dec. 9, 2013, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49129; see also Sudan’s Presi-
dent, Wanted by International Court, Cancels Visit to U.N., N.Y. Times, Sept. 
25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/world/africa/sudans-president-
wanted-by-international-court-cancels-visit-to-
un.html?ref=omarhassanalbashir. 
147 Kenya to Challenge High Court Judge’s Arrest Warrant for Sudanese 
President, CNN, Nov. 30, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/30/world/africa/kenya-sudan-spat/. 
148 Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Politi-
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There have also been “ad hoc” international tribunals that 
were constituted outside the country where wrongs occurred 
and were presided over by international judges who applied in-
ternational law.
149
  Through these tribunals, the collective will 
to impose criminal liability for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes prevailed over official immunity.
150
  By Security 
Council resolution, the International Criminal Tribunal (ICTY) 
was established, pierced official immunity, and extended juris-
diction over all “persons responsible for serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991.”
151
  The ICTY prosecuted Presi-
dent Slobodan Milosevic
152
 and other top government lead-
                                                                                                                                  
cal Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 
A.J.I.L. 1, 2 (2011)(noting that even in European countries, such as Germany, 
England, France, Belgium, and Spain, which all have adopted universal ju-
risdiction statutes, “states have acted differently regarding similar com-
plaints”); See Also Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Pun-
ishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 539, 541-42, 550, 
588 (2005) (“Choices of which atrocity to judicialize and which individuals to 
prosecute are so deeply politicized that it is problematic to pretend that they 
are in any way neutral or impartial,” thus resulting in the failure to appor-
tion blame concomitant with responsibility with powerful states being ab-
solved of responsibility); Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of 
Law: What’s the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 899 (2005) (stating 
that the “failure to indict officials from the strong states, while relying on an 
increasingly moralistic body of law to impose punishments on a steady pa-
rade of officials from failed states or states defeated militarily by the United 
States and NATO, will undermine significantly the legitimacy of the ICC”). 
149 John Dermody, Note, Beyond Good Intentions: Can Hybrid Tribunals 
Work After Unilateral Intervention?, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 77, 
81 (2006). 
150 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity 
from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 45-60 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (not-
ing that this balance between immunity and imposing punishment is found 
in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the 
Nuremburg Charter). 
151 S.C. Res. 827, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), as amended 
by S.C. Res. 1166 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (May 13, 1998) (establishing ICTY).  
152 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance 
with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 711, 805 (2008); David Tolbert, The Evolving Architecture of 
International Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
37
ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:38 PM 
434 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::2 
 
ers.
153
  Shortly after the ICTY was established and also deriv-
ing from authority found in a Security Council resolution, offi-
cial immunity was denied to Rwandan Prime Minister Jean 
Kambanda in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwan-
da.
154
 
Based on the principle that the national criminal jurisdic-
tion where war crimes and crimes against humanity were per-
petrated is an optimal forum,
155
 domestic and international au-
thorities established hybrid domestic tribunals to hold former 
leaders responsible under international human rights law in 
East Timor, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone.
156
  The Special Court 
                                                                                                                                  
goslavia: Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER 
FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 7, 7 (2002). 
153 Kenneth Roth, ICTY: A Tribunal’s Legal Stumble, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2013, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/09/icty-tribunal-s-legal-
stumble (reporting that there have been 69 convictions of people involved in 
ethnic cleansing in the 1990s Balkan wars). 
154 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sen-
tence, (Sept. 4, 1998) available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/KAMBANDA_ICTR-97-
23/KAMBANDA_ICTR-97-23-S.html; Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (es-
tablishing ICTR). 
155 Karim Khan & Rodney Dixon, Archbold: International Criminal 
Courts: Practice, Procedure & Evidence, vii (2d ed. 2005) (stating that “[t]he 
primary responsibility for punishing crimes of international concern such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes belongs to national crimi-
nal jurisdictions.”); Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementary and Conflicting 
Relationship Between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 139, 143 (2003) 
(noting that hybrid court/truth commission systems were supported by the 
UN). 
156 International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Are They Necessary?, in  
Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East Timor, 
Kosovo, and Cambodia (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds. 2004); Jane E. Strom-
seth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities after Conflict: What Impact on 
Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 280, 297-98 (2007) (stating 
that hybrid tribunals first emerged in the late 1990s and have since included 
criminal trials in Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone).  At the UN 
General Assembly’s request, in 1998, the Secretary-General appointed the 
Group of Experts for Cambodia to produce a brief report on atrocities commit-
ted by the Khmer Rouge regime but it was not a significant fact-finding mis-
sion.  Group of Experts, The Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Es-
tablished Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, at 6, U.N. Doc. 
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for Sierra Leone implemented a jurisdictional mandate to 
“prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the 
commission of serious violations of international humanitarian 
law and crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law.”
157
  
Likewise, with US guidance, training of judges, and evidence 
gathering, Saddam Hussein was convicted under Iraqi law in 
its special domestic tribunal.
158
  Other countries have adopted 
the less punitive method of constituting truth commissions to 
address past wrongs.
159
  As distinguished from the Arrest War-
rant case, when the home sovereign jurisdiction does control or 
participate in proceedings to render justice or conducts investi-
gations to redress for past crimes that occurred within its own 
jurisdiction, concerns over intrusion on judging sovereign head 
of state actions are attenuated. 
2. Ambiguity within the Contentious Case Precedent 
In rendering its decision on the balance between enforcing 
                                                                                                                                  
S/1999/231, A/53/850 (Mar. 16, 1999); Stromseth, supra, at 286-89, 296 (not-
ing that East Timor’s hybrid tribunal had only marginal success and tried 
only mid- and low-level suspects). 
157 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra 
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone P 1, U.N.-
Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, http http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html 
158 Zakia Afrin, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, 14 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 23, 26-29 (2008). 
159 O-Gon Kwon, Procedural Challenges Faced by International Criminal 
Tribunals and the Value of Codification in International Criminal Procedure: 
Rules and Principles 1415-18 (Goran Sluiter, Hakan Friman, Suzannah Lin-
ton, Salvatore Zappala & Sergehy Vasiliev, eds. 2013) (noting that due to the 
potential populace division over the acts of former leaders, domestic forums 
can face significant political challenges).  Domestic political division may 
have been a reason for the substantial growth in the number of truth com-
missions.  Dana Michael Hollywood, The Search for Post-Conflict Justice in 
Iraq: A Comparative Study of Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Their 
Applicability to Post-Saddam Iraq, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 59, 70-71 (2007) (not-
ing that the number of truth commissions grew from six during the 1970s 
and 1980s to fourteen during the 1990s); Jon M. Van Dyke, Promoting Ac-
countability for Human Rights Abuses, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 153, 157 n.15 (2005) 
(twenty-three truth commissions have conducted investigations); See general-
ly Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and 
Atrocity 14-15 (2001). 
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universal jurisdiction crimes, such as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, and the customary law of official immunity, 
the ICJ referenced that it did not find cases in which heads of 
state and foreign ministers were subject to the criminal juris-
diction of national courts.
160
  This issue festered in the high-
profile case of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet in 
1998.   
In 1985, Spain adopted a provision for criminal jurisdiction 
over universal offenses
161
 and issued an arrest warrant for Pi-
nochet for torture, murder, and other crimes against humanity 
committed against the Chilean people after the 1973 coup.
162
  
Spain sought jurisdiction over Pinochet when he was seeking 
medical treatment in Britain.  The British House of Lords as-
sessed the legitimacy of Spain’s arrest warrant and extradition 
request on virtually all charges and ultimately held that Pino-
chet could be extradited to Spain because torture and other 
crimes against humanity are universal crimes that are not like-
ly official functions.
163
  However, Pinochet was not extradited 
to Spain because of his inability to stand trial due to health 
reasons; the grounds were unrelated to the validity of an arrest 
warrant issued by a national court.
164
  Spain did convict a low-
er level military official and has pursued several other military 
officials in its courts for crimes against humanity committed 
                                                          
160 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, supra note 137 at ¶¶ 58-61. 
161 Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [Organic Law of the Judicial Power] 
art. 23(4) (B.O.E. 1985, 157 (Spain). 
162 R. v. Bow St. Metrop. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte) (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 190-93, 205 (appealed from Divisional 
Court of the Queen’s Bench).  The Pinochet dictatorship murdered or caused 
the disappearance of over 2,000 individuals and tortured an estimated 27,000 
people.  Van Dyke, supra note 159, at 157-58. 
163 R. v. Bow St. Metrop. Stipendiary Magistrate (2000), 1 A.C. 147 at 
190-93, 205 (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte). 
164 Homecoming for General Pinochet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/04/opinion/homecoming-for-general-
pinochet.html (remarking that the extradition to Chile was based on a secret 
medical examination and that Home Secretary Jack Straw believed justice 
would not be served when Pinochet was so “enfeebled and mentally incompe-
tent” but that courts in Belgium, Britain, France, Spain, and Switzerland ob-
jected). 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:38 PM 
2015] A THEORIZATION ON EQUITY 437 
 
during Argentina’s Dirty Wars in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  Argentina has recently sought the extradition of Span-
ish officials serving under the Francisco Franco dictatorship in 
Spain.
165
 
Two months after the ICJ handed down the Arrest War-
rant decision, Germany enacted the German Code of Crimes 
Against International Law to permit its courts to assert crimi-
nal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide.
166
  Consequently, Germany investigated Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld and CIA Director George Tenet for the Bush 
Administration’s interrogation practices that were alleged to be 
torture, but the court dismissed the case because it believed the 
U.S. would be the more appropriate forum.
167
  Germany’s first 
indictment under the German Code of Crimes Against Interna-
tional Law occurred in 2011 against Rwandan rebel leaders for 
crimes against humanity.
168
  None of these proceedings were 
brought against heads of state. 
A home state can also waive immunity to permit another 
state to exercise jurisdiction over the head of state.
169
  Whether 
a waiver is granted is less likely to depend on the gravity of the 
alleged offenses in question and more likely to hinge on the 
succeeding government’s political willingness to waive jurisdic-
tion.  For example, when Spain petitioned Britain to extradite 
Pinochet to Spain, the Chilean government supported Pinochet, 
                                                          
165 Raphael Minder, Argentine Judge Seeks to Put Franco Officials on 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/world/ 
europe/argentine-judge-seeks-to-put-franco-officials-on-trial.html?_r=0. 
166 Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes Against International Law [ of 26 
June 2002 (trans. by Brian Duffett), 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/VoeStGB.pdf. 
167 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 93, at 79, 119-25, 206; Sandra 
Coliver, Jennie Green, & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Ac-
countable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and 
Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 206 (2005). 
168 Diana Magnay, 2 Alleged Rwandan Rebel Leaders Face War Crime 
Charges in Germany, CNN, May 4, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/05/04/germany.rwanda.war.crimes/. 
169 Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 61; Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 
209–11 (S.D. Fl. 1993); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1518–19 
(S.D. Fl. 1990); In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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did not waive immunity, fought extradition, and threatened to 
summon Spain to the ICJ for a violation of international law.
170
  
Yet this might not have been the position of the Chilean people 
at the time because polls revealed that Chileans believed Pino-
chet should have been brought to justice.
171
 
3. Extraterritoriality and Wars of Aggression 
In all of the cases previously addressed, government lead-
ers perpetrated atrocities inside their home sovereign jurisdic-
tion, but wrongs were so grave that international actors ad-
vanced a significant interest in transnational protection of 
human rights.  This can be distinguished from the circum-
stance in which leaders promulgate orders for extraterritorial 
acts, such as by directing an illegal war and by issuing direc-
tives that may be war crimes in a foreign war zone, which may 
have direct reverberating effects on the international commu-
nity.  A war of aggression has been called the “supreme” form 
of crime
172
 and the act of state doctrine refers to the premise 
                                                          
170 Chile: Life Without Pinochet, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 1999, 
http://www.economist.com/node/325551 (also stating that “[s]ince Chile re-
turned to democracy in 1990, its conservative opposition has held a veto over 
change”). 
171 Transnational Institute, Chile and the End of Pinochet, Nov. 17, 2005, 
http://www.tni.org/es/archives/act/4095 (stating that “Chilean opinion polls 
have consistently shown clear national majorities in favor of holding Pinochet 
and the military accountable for the crimes of the dictatorship”); Rosalba 
O’Brien, Forty Years After Coup, Pinochet Again Divides Chile, REUTERS, 
Sept. 8, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/08/us-chile-pinochet-
idUSBRE98705J20130908 (reporting that 55% of Chileans viewed Pinochet’s 
regime as “all bad” and only 9% viewed it as “all good.”).  Over forty cases 
were filed in Chile against Pinochet personally.  Chile: Life Without Pinochet, 
supra note 170.  Chilean courts stripped Pinochet of immunity several times 
since 2000, but health concerns prevented criminal trials for human rights 
crimes prior to his death in 2006.  Chile Timeline, BBC, (last updated Aug. 
14, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1222905.stm. 
172 ROBERTO BELLELLI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND 
PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 580 (2010); William A. 
Schabas, The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression: How Many Times 
Must the Cannonballs Fly, Before They are Forever Banned?, in THE 
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 123-
26 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004). 
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that “the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the 
acts of the government of another, done within its own territo-
ry.”
173
 
ICJ President Guillaume pointed out that there is univer-
sal jurisdiction for certain criminal acts occurring extraterrito-
rially, such as piracy,
174
 and an argument can be made that 
treaties and customary international law mandate states to af-
firmatively act to punish for the most serious crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.
175
  In The Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction, the professors wrote “[t]he principle of 
universal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain crimes 
are so harmful to international interests that states are enti-
tled—and even obliged—to bring proceedings against the per-
                                                          
173 Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252. (Italics added). 
174 Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶¶ 12, 16 (separate opinion of Court 
President Guillaume); David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al 
Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM AND MARY L. REV. 957, 967-68 (2009) 
(referencing that treaties have made terrorism a crime subject to universal 
jurisdiction). 
175 Non-derogative rules are those offenses for which no exception is per-
mitted.  Non-derogation is inherent to the concept of “jus cogens,” which the 
Vienna Convention defines as a “peremptory norm of general international 
law . . . accepted and recognized by the international community of States as 
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May. 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.; Amnesty International, Denounce Torture: Torture and 
the Law (Nov. 2001), 
http://www.kintera.org/site/pp.asp?c=fnKNKUOyHqE&b=1196455 (calling 
the prohibition on torture a “peremptory norm” that prevails over all incon-
sistent customary laws); Jordan J. Paust, Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et 
al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment and Forced Dis-
appearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (2009) (noting that the Bush 
Administration’s 2001 to 2009 sanctions to use secret detention, forced disap-
pearances, and coercive interrogations involved “serial criminality,” war 
crimes, torture, and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment that “im-
plicat[es] universal jurisdiction and a universal responsibility.”); Steven R. 
Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87 
GEO. L J. 707, 727 (1999) (stating that customary international law suggests 
“accountability is legally required”); See contra John Dugard, Is the Truth 
and Reconciliation Process Compatible with International law ? An Unan-
swered Question, 13 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 258, 267 (1997) (human rights trea-
ties do not seem to per se obligate prosecution) 
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petrator, regardless of the location of the crime or the national-
ity of the perpetrator or the victim.”
176
 
With respect to prosecuting criminal acts deriving from a 
war of aggression, in 1919, the Allies composed a commission to 
investigate war crimes violations committed during World War 
I and compiled a list of twenty thousand German perpetra-
tors.
177
  This finding was incorporated into the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles, which directed Germany to prosecute over eight 
hundred of the selected war criminals in domestic courts.
178
   
The Allied victory in World War II gave the US, UK, 
France, and the Soviet Union the ability to impose justice over 
occupied Germany and Japan.  In 1945 the International Mili-
tary Tribunal (IMT) was constituted to try German war crimi-
nals under a newly-created charter to punish crimes against 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
179
  The Nu-
remberg Charter stripped defendants of official immunity and 
the defense of acting pursuant to superior orders
180
 and the 
IMT acquitted three defendants and convicted nineteen, with 
twelve sentenced to death.
181
 
                                                          
176 Stephen Macedo, et al., The Princeton Principles on Universal Juris-
diction 16 (2001). 
177 M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: “The War to End all Wars,” and the 
Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 244, 281 (2002). 
178 M. Cherif Bassiouni & Michael Wahid Hanna, Ceding the High 
Ground: The Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute and the Trial of Saddam 
Hussein, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21, 91-92 (2006/2007) (reporting that the 
local Prosecutor General only considered forty-five cases and indicted twenty-
two individuals). 
179 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, arts. 6, 27, Aug. 8, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (articulating open-ended sentencing 
guidelines of “the right to impose. . . death or such other punishment as shall 
be determined. . . to be just” on conviction); See also Bernard Meltzer, Re-
membering Nuremberg, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 20 
(Belinda Cooper ed., 1999); KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE 
POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 28-29 (2006). 
180 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 179, arts. 
7-8. 
181 Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 166, 189-90 (1947) 
(proceedings were conducted for 315 days). 
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After the Japanese surrender during World War II, the In-
strument of Surrender stated that “the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers. . .will take such steps as he deems proper 
to effectuate these terms of surrender,” which included bring-
ing war criminals to justice.
182
  In January 1946, General 
Douglas MacArthur unilaterally established the tribunal by 
special proclamation
183
 and the IMT for the Far East found 
seventy-eight defendants guilty, imposed seven death sentenc-
es, and imposed sentences that ranged from seven years to life 
on the remaining convictees.
184
 
The offenses that were prosecuted by World War II IMTs 
formed the bedrock of the UN Charter.
185
  On October 23, 1946, 
President Harry Truman addressed the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly and recommended that the Nuremberg Princi-
ples be codified into international law
186
 and less than two 
months later the General Assembly affirmed the condemnation 
of wars of aggression in Resolution 95.
187
  Later resolutions 
recognized that wars of aggression are proscribed as customary 
international law.
188
 
                                                          
182 Instrument of Surrender, at 8, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733, 139 
U.N.T.S. 387; Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, at 10, 
July 26, 1945. 
183 See Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589. 
184 Zhang Wanhong, From Nuremberg to Tokyo: Some Reflections on the 
Tokyo Trial, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2006). 
185 U.N. Charter art. 2(3) (“All Members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security, and justice, are not endangered.”); Id. art. 2(4) (requiring states to 
“refrain. . .from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.”); Id., at Ch. VII (authorizing the Security 
Council to assess and act on threats to international peace and security). 
186 U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, The Charter and Judgment of the Nurnberg 
Tribunal: History and Analysis, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5, U.N. Sales No. 
1949.V.7 (1949). 
187 G.A. Res. 95 (I), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.2 (Dec. 11, 1946) (affirm-
ing the international law principles “recognized by the Charter of the Nurn-
berg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal”). 
188 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggres-
sion, at 11, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Mar. 11-
Apr. 12, 1974); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 
45
ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:38 PM 
442 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::2 
 
 The legality for the use of force and actions jus in bello 
and jus post bellum determine whether an invading and occu-
pying force may owe damages for wrongs.
189
  Following the 
Gulf War, Security Council Resolution 687 stated: “Iraq . . . is 
liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, in-
cluding environmental damage and the depletion of natural re-
sources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corpo-
rations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait.”
190
  The Security Council established a subsidiary 
organ to receive damage claims and the organ utilized inquisi-
torial investigative standards to determine “direct losses, dam-
ages, and injuries caused by Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.”
191
  
                                                                                                                                  
I.C.J. 14, 102-04 (June 27). 
189 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 102-04 (June 27); GROTIUS, supra note 79, at 192-94 (affirming that resti-
tution is required for illegal wars); Yael Rouen, Illegal Occupation and Its 
Consequences, 41 ISR. L. REV. 201, 201, 244 (2008) (noting that an occupation 
is “illegal if it involves the violation of a peremptory norm of international 
law,” such as through a “violation on the use of force, or maintained in viola-
tion in the right to self-determination.”); See e.g. Lene Bomann-Larsen, Li-
cense to Kill? The Question of Just v. Unjust Combatants, 3 J. MIL. ETHICS 
142, 148 (2004)(“If U.S. troops had no warrant to be in Vietnam in the first 
place, how can any killing and destruction in the pursuit of their unjust cause 
be morally justified?”).   
Legality of actions under jus post bellum might depend on whether the 
initial use of military force was legal.  ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING 
UNDER OCCUPATION 25 (2009) (emphasizing that the “UN General Assembly 
implied that occupations resulting from illegal wars, that is, wars neither of 
self-defense nor ordered by the UN Security Council according to chapter VII, 
were themselves illegal.”); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 
438-39 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) (noting that with violations of the 
laws of war, it is unclear that international law mandates the occupied popu-
lation to be obedient to the occupier); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 6-7 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950) (expressing that if 
an occupation is unlawful then it is impossible to have a legal obligation of 
obeisance within the populace that is occupied); Brown, supra note 79, at 26  
(stating that an occupier still “bears continuing post-war responsibility”).  
190 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991), para. 16. 
191 Chung, supra note 79, at 145; Id. at 153-55, 162-63 (noting that dam-
age claims were tendered, but Iraq had marginal ability to refute plaintiffs 
that frequently lacked records and evidence to substantiate the merits of the 
wrongs and harm).  Moreover, Hussein’s teetering and internationally-
ostracized regime would seem uninterested in the state’s future financial ac-
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Individuals and entities filed 2.68 million claims seeking more 
than $350 billion in compensation,
192
 which was eight times the 
country’s entire annual gross domestic product.
193
  The country 
was apparently not excessively devastated because Kuwait’s 
GDP rose to $37.57 billion the year after Iraq was expelled in 
1992 and to an all-time high of $51.4 billion in 1993.
194
 
 The mass tort-like liability assessed against Iraq follow-
ing the Gulf War serves as precedent that international law re-
quires damages to be paid for an illegal invasion
195
 and, in con-
junction with IMT precedent, possibly even that personal 
capacity claims could be brought.
196
  To parameterize the con-
                                                                                                                                  
counts or in responding to abuse accusations. 
192 Chung, supra note 79, at 147-50; Anderson, supra note 79, at 433;  
Chung, supra note 79, at 149-50 (explaining that the Commission placed 
claims of individuals into A, B, C, and D Categories that were quite analo-
gous to tort law—“A” Claims assessed damages of $2,500 to $8,000 to those 
required to evacuate, and B, C, and D Claims involved those who “suffered 
personal injury” or damage as a result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation, 
which may ranged into the hundreds of thousands of dollars). 
193 From 1985 to 1990, Kuwait’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
averaged $41.3 billion, WORLD BANK, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK DATABASE, 
Apr. 2008, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx (us-
ing “Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valua-
tion of country GDP” totals to $248.036 billion over the six-year period). 
194 Id. (using “Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity 
(PPP) valuation of country GDP,”); CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 58 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) 
(noting that violence in Kuwait had a comparatively small death toll relative 
to other conflicts). 
195 Tim Taylor & SJ Berwin, War: The Mother of All Mass Torts?, 6 
SEDONA CONF. J. 161, 161, 167 (2005) (emphasizing that war might be viewed 
as a mass tort and that the legality of warfare could be tested in internation-
al courts).  The 1991 Gulf War Tribunal assessed liability against the state 
for the government’s acts, although Hussein’s regime monopolized govern-
ment revenues while in power. 
196 If a war is illegal and could impose criminal liability on government 
leaders, pursuant to a “beyond a reasonable doubt” or similarly high-
threshold burden of evidence, it seems that civil liability, with a lower 
threshold burden of “preponderance of the evidence,” could also be assessed 
and would be justified against government leaders who placed illegal actions 
in motion.  Civil actions have been brought against heads of state for human 
rights abuses in foreign courts.  JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF 
STATE AND SENIOR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-72 (2014) (noting 
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text of civil immunities in infra part IV(C), the next section ad-
dresses how the Bush Administration pushed for the 2003 in-
vasion of Iraq against the will of the international community 
and how it sought diplomatic assent from states based on do-
mestically-constituted false allegations. 
4. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administra-
tion avowed that secret intelligence information confirmed that 
Iraq possessed prohibited weapons and programs that posed a 
security threat to the US, but United Nations inspection teams 
were unable to uncover those alleged weapons during several 
months of inspections prior to the war and periodically updated 
the Security Council of its lack of an incriminating discovery 
and of generally favorable Iraqi compliance with the process.197  
Most Security Council members opposed the use of force, called 
an invasion without Council authorization illegal, and wanted 
to grant inspectors additional time to ensure that there were no 
proscribed weapon programs, but the Bush administration or-
dered an attack without an authorization.198  
                                                                                                                                  
that some foreign courts have not drawn a distinction between head of state 
immunity in criminal and civil proceedings, which barred cases, and others 
have made a distinction between civil and criminal immunity, and emphasiz-
ing that this same division has been found in U.S. courts under the Alien 
Tort Statute jurisprudence).  In a diplomatic example involving the recent 
crisis over Russia’s annexation of Crimea, following the populace’s ratifica-
tion to become part of Russia, President Obama civilly sanctioned a list of 
high-level Russian officials in their individual capacity, but not Russian Pres-
ident Putin.  Aamer Madhani, Obama Imposes Sanctions on 7 Russians After 
Crimea Vote, USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 2014, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/17/white-house-
sanctions-russia-officials-ukraine/6518417/. 
197 Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 78, at 370-75. 
198 Id. at 342-50; Thomas M. Frank, The Power of Legitimacy and the Le-
gitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 
A.J.I.L. 88, 97 (2006) (stating that the Bush administration continued to 
promote myths of connections between al-Qaeda and Iraq and of Iraqi weap-
ons of mass destruction even though there was no evidence, and remarking 
that they “prefer[red] to live in a bubble of false information, rather than 
stand exposed as facilitators of what is defined as aggression”).  
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:38 PM 
2015] A THEORIZATION ON EQUITY 445 
 
After the invasion, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan remarked that, “from our point of view, [and] from the 
Charter point of view, it was illegal.”199  As a response to the 
invasion of Iraq, the U.N. Secretary-Generals’ High-Level Pan-
el on Threats, Challenges and Change was constituted and 
concluded that the context of the Iraq invasion would make 
such a military attack illegal.200  Nelson Mandela, the late for-
mer South Africa President and Nobel Laureate, stated of the 
Bush Administration’s bellicosity that led to the Iraq War: 
“What I am condemning is . . . one power, with a president who 
has no foresight, who cannot think properly. . .If there is any 
country that has committed unspeakable atrocities in the 
world, it is the United States of America. They don’t care.”201  
There were 116 Non-Aligned Movement countries and 57 Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference members opposed to the 
use of force against Iraq.202  One week into the invasion, the 22 
                                                          
199 Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC, Sept. 16, 2004, available at 
http://new.bbc.co.uk!2/hi/3661134/stm; Felicity Barringer, Annan Warns of 
World Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A16 (Annan calling the action a 
threat to the U.N.’s viability that placed the Security Council system in “cri-
sis”); Malaysian PM Condemns Iraq War, BBC, Mar. 24, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/2880519.stm (reporting that 
the Malaysian Prime Minister sought to bring criminal charges for the inva-
sion). 
200 HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, A MORE 
SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 63, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at 
https://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pd
f (“in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order 
and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply 
too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action”); Sean D. Murphy, 
Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 177 (2004) (explain-
ing that the Bush Administration’s legal theory was “not persuasive”); Thom-
as M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 607, 608 (2003) (stating that a few Bush Administration lawyers still 
offered “self-defense” or anteceding collective security authorizations by the 
Security Council as rationales, but political officials “boldly proclaim[ed] a 
new policy that openly repudiates the Article 2(4) obligation”). 
201 Jarrett Murphy, Mandela Slams Bush on Iraq, CBS NEWS, Jan. 30, 
2003 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/0 I/30/iraq/main538607.shtml. 
202 U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg. at 17, 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726 
(Mar. 26, 2003) (Brazilian delegation remarked that it “profoundly deplore[s] 
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members of the Arab League held an emergency summit in 
Cairo and adopted a unanimous resolution, with only Kuwait 
abstaining that, “demanded the immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal of U.S. and British forces from Iraq” and pro-
nounced that the attack was a “violation of the United Nations 
Charter and a threat to world peace.”203  While Spanish Prime 
Minister Jose Maria Aznar was one of President Bush’s spot-
lighted coalition members prior to the invasion,204 one year af-
ter the war, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the new Spanish 
prime minister referenced Iraq and remarked: “pre-emptive 
wars, never again; violations of international law, never 
again.”205  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the International Criminal 
Court’s chief prosecutor, stated that President Bush or British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair might one day have to answer in-
vestigations on war crimes charges.206  In September 2012, No-
bel Laureate Desmond Tutu “called . . . for Tony Blair and 
George Bush to face prosecution at the International Criminal 
Court for their role in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.”207 
                                                                                                                                  
the initiation of military action and, in particular, the fact that force has been 
used without the express authorization of the Security Council”). 
203 Arab States Line Up Behind Iraq, BBC, Mar. 25, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2882851.stm; Final Communique of 
the Thirty-first Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Istan-
bul, para. 41 (June 16, 2004), reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Work of the Organization, UN Doc. A/58/856-S/2004/582, at 6, 13 (stating 
that the Conference adamantly rejected “the principle of preemptive military 
strikes against any country under any pretext whatsoever”).  
204 Full Text: Azores Press Conference, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 2005, 
http://theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/17/iraq.politics2. 
205 Iraq Proves Pre-emptive Wars Fail: Spanish PM, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
May 3, 2004; Debate: “Will Hussein Get a Fair Trial?”, 37 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 21, 23-24 (2006/2007) (stating that Professor Doebbler noted that dur-
ing his discussions with internationa11awyers and political representatives 
from sixty countries, all called the aggression “illegal” and the only argu-
ments came from U.S. lawyers). 
206 Gethin Chamberlain, Court ‘Can Envisage’ Blair Prosecution, SUNDAY 
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 18, 2007, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1545876/Court-can-envisage-Blair-
prosecution.html. 
207 Tutu: Bush, Blair Should Face Trial at the Hague, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Sept. 2, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/ 
2012-09-02/tutu-bush-iraq/57534404/1.  
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 For the following chronological detail relating to the in-
ference that the war would be forthcoming irrespective of the 
veracity of allegations about illicit weapons and security 
threats and whether there was a legal basis to use force, it is 
important to underscore that the invasion of Iraq took place on 
March 19, 2003 and that post-war investigations determined 
that Iraq had no WMDs or ties to al-Qaeda.208  According to 
former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill’s interview on 60 
Minutes, the newly-inaugurated president tasked appointees to 
search for ways to overthrow the Iraqi regime at the first Na-
tional Security Council meetings in January and February 
2001.209  The New York Times sued the Department of Defense 
in a Freedom of Information Act action and in 2008 finally ob-
tained 8,000 pages of “e-mail messages, transcripts and records 
describing years of private briefings” and discovered that 
Bush’s appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense de-
veloped a program that would employ “independent” military 
analysts who would appear in the national news to persuade an 
unwilling American populace for an invasion and occupation of 
Iraq.210  The New York Times reported that the program was 
developed before 9/11, and that the propaganda program was 
                                                          
208 Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 78, at 817-19, 858-59, 
875-77. 
209 Based on former Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill’s startling inter-
view on 60 Minutes in 2004 and from the accounts of other officials, top Bush 
Administration officials examined methods to depose the Iraqi government at 
the first White House National Security Council meetings in January and 
February 2001.  Robert Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L. REV. 
29, 63-64 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Politico]; Robert Bejesky, Geopolitics, 
Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market Expectations, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 
193, 215-20, 229-31 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Geopolitics] (explaining that 
the White House established a Future of Iraq Project in early 2002, which se-
lected Iraqi defectors to generate several volumes of advisory reports for gov-
ernment and private sector reform during a planned occupation of Iraq, and 
referencing that those defectors became prominent government officials in 
Iraq after Hussein’s regime was ousted); Eric Schmitt & James Dao, Iraq is 
Focal Point as Bush Meets with Joint Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 11, 2001), at 
A20 (noting the focus on Iraq even prior to inauguration). 
210 David Barstow, Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand: Court-
ing Ex-Officers Tied to Military Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at 
A1. 
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implemented and carried out for several years.211  Appointees 
within the Secretary of Defense for Policy established an Office 
of Special Plans,212 which, according to the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence’s investigation, was an unofficial and 
unauthorized intelligence unit within the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense that created and provided unsubstantiated al-
legations about threats from Iraq to the White House.213 
 Iraqi defectors, who desired regime change, held a favor-
able relationship with the Bush administration and appeared 
in the media with terrorist and chemical, biological, and nucle-
ar weapon allegations after the initial White House National 
Security Council meetings and after 9/11.214  The Bush Admin-
istration commenced a White House-based Future of Iraq Pro-
ject in early 2002 and staffed the project with defectors who 
proposed economic, social and government reforms in the event 
                                                          
211 Id. 
212 Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-
Aided Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 33 
(2007). 
213 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF 
PRE-IRAQI WAR ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR POLICY, Feb. 9, 2007, available at 
http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/02/09/dodig.execsummary.020907.pdf; 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
RELATING TO IRAQ CONDUCTED BY THE POLICY COUNTERTERRORISM EVALUATION 
GROUP AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PLANS WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 2, S. REP. NO. 108-301, June 5, 2008 (Sen-
ator Levin criticizing and proposing to “Review the activities of the Undersec-
retary of Defense for Policy” in September 2005). 
214 Robert Bejesky, Defectors and the Moral Hazard Problem, 5 WM. & 
MARY POL’Y REV. (Forthcoming 2014); Bejesky, Politico, supra note 209, at 62-
66.  The Administration increased funding to the Iraqi National Congress, 
the group of defectors assembled by the CIA in the early 1990s, and they 
sourced information pertaining to military operations, weapons, war crimes, 
and internal developments inside Iraq.  S. REP. 109-330, at 30 (stating that 
between May and July, “[t]he National Security Council Deputies Committee 
decided that the [INC] program should be continued”); Martin Kettle, Bush 
Funds Iraqi Opposition, GUARDIAN UK, Feb. 2, 2001, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/feb/03/iraq.usa.  In May 2002, the 
State Department ceased funding the INC, but two months later Bush’s Na-
tional Security Council reapproved INC operations; and in late-October 2002 
the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”) accepted responsibility 
for the INC. S. REP. 109-330, at 30-31. 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:38 PM 
2015] A THEORIZATION ON EQUITY 449 
 
of the overthrow of Hussein’s regime.215  The Bush White 
House constituted an Office of Global Communication (OGC) 
that spearheaded the operations of public relations (PR) 
firms.216  Consequently, PR firms introduced talking points 
about Iraq for the president and other top officials,217 including 
by using defector accounts218 and coached dissidents on strate-
gies to appear cogent in the mass media, while flooding the 
media with the White House’s message.219  The Times of Lon-
don wrote that the OGC earmarked $200 million for a “PR blitz 
against Saddam Hussein . . . [to persuade] American and for-
eign audiences, particularly in Arab nations skeptical of U.S. 
                                                          
215 Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 209, at 215-19. 
216 Robert Bejesky, Public Diplomacy or Propaganda? Targeted Messages 
and Tardy Corrections to Unverified Reporting, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 967, 992, 
1033-34 (2012). 
217 GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE’S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED 
STATES, AND THE RISE OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM 229 (2006); Martha Brant, 
West Wing Story: Ladies and Gentlemen . . . the Band, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 
2002, http://www.newsweek.com/west-wing-story-ladies-and-gentlemen-band-
144997 (emphasizing the Bush Administration’s depth and expanse of infor-
mation domination that marketed war); Douglas Quenqua, U.S. Training 
Iraqis in Media to Raise Support for Attack, PR WEEK, Sept. 2, 2002, 
http://www.prweekus.com/article/us-training-iraqis-media-raise-support-
attack/1233725 (reporting that the “State Department has begun providing 
media training to a handful of Iraqi dissident who will help make the Bush 
administration’s argument for the removal of Saddam Hussein.”). 
218 See S. REP. 109-330, at 187 (noting that seven of the fifteen SSCI Sen-
ators believed that the investigation should have more deeply assessed the 
false information that the INC directly transmitted to the Bush Administra-
tion and U.S. government agencies, which bypassed the Intelligence Commu-
nity).  The Director of the INC’s Washington office wrote in a June 26, 2002 
memo to the Senate Appropriations Committee that justified its funding: 
“[d]efectors, reports, and raw intelligence are cultivated and analyzed and the 
results are reported through the INC newspaper (Al Mutamar), the [A]rabic 
and western media and to appropriate governmental, non-governmental and 
international agencies . . . [and to] U.S. Governmental recipients . . . [in] the 
Department of Defense [and the White House].”  Id.  This memo was deliv-
ered while the State Department had responsibility for monitoring INC activ-
ities and the memo revealed that the five individuals on the team who ana-
lyzed and processed the raw data for Al Mutamar’s reports were all inner 
members of the INC.  James Risen, Data From Iraqi Exiles Under Scrutiny: 
War Critics Say U.S. Relied Too Much on Dubious Information, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 12, 2004, at A16. 
219 GRANDIN, supra note 217, at 229. 
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policy in the region [and utilized] . . . advertising techniques to 
persuade crucial target groups that the Iraqi leader must be 
ousted.”220 
 Covert operations were designed for Iraq.  In late 2001, 
Bush approved covert operations for the CIA (called “Anaba-
sis”) that consisted of implementing propaganda operations in-
side Iraq that would disseminate that the regime was under 
threat and designing plans for blowing up railroad lines and 
communication towers and assassinating key officials, all of 
which could impel retaliation and initiate a war.221  In April 
2002, Anabasis involved recruiting Kurds for operations that 
would have endangered their lives if the Iraqi government had 
discovered the operations, but to induce Kurds to participate, 
CIA officials and the Bush Administration guaranteed that 
there would be a military invasion.222  Indeed, President Bush 
tasked military commanders with developing war plans start-
ing in November 2001 and received periodic briefings on se-
quential iterations of the war plans, while officials publicly de-
nied that there were war plans or diverted the topic when 
journalists inquired.223 
 All of this preplanning for war began long before Con-
gress and the United Nations Security Council even contem-
plated the issue of Iraq in September and October of 2002, but 
the publicity was already convincing the American public of the 
peril from Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.224  What 
befell at the international level and led to an invasion without 
Security Council approval was opprobrious, but strife also de-
                                                          
220 Shelton Rampton & John Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception: The 
Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq 38 (2003). 
221 Michael Isikoff & David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, 
Scandal, and Selling of the Iraq War 7-8, 10, 153, 155-57 (2006). 
222 Id. at 10-12, 47, 82, 156. 
223 BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 3-4, 30-31, 34-37, 40, 42, 55-59, 75-
79, 96-103, 120-25, 129-30, 137, 157-59, 188 (2004).  There was an early polit-
ical agenda to go to war, and by mid-2002, the media announced that there 
were indeed war plans and that U.S. troops were being deployed to countries 
contiguous to Iraq.  Bejesky, Politico, supra note 209, at 62-70. 
224 Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343, 348-50, 352-53 (2012). 
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veloped on constitutional war powers, which calls for an as-
sessment of domestic-level official immunities and an examina-
tion of whether equity might gainsay grounds for granting im-
munity. 
C. Domestic Level: Public Policy and Comity 
1. Official Immunities and the FTCA/FELRTCA 
The extent to which US law affords civil immunity to US 
government officials can be relevant to equity and comity con-
siderations, to provide a signal for US policy if a US court is re-
quested to enforce a foreign court’s judgment, and to indicate 
whether a foreigner can initiate a civil claim against a US offi-
cial in American courts.  Substantive international law prohib-
its wars of aggression, U.S. law proscribes war crimes,225 and 
potential theories of culpability identify those who can be held 
liable for transgressing international law, but there are sub-
stantial hurdles that prevent U.S. courts from rendering crimi-
nal punishment or civil damages on US government officials. 
Sovereign immunity has historically bestowed U.S. gov-
ernment officials with plenary immunity for ex officio duties, 
including for tortious conduct,226 so that political leaders and 
administrators can exercise reasonable and efficient discretion 
without presentiment of punishment227 or the specter of frivo-
                                                          
225
 Samuel Brenner, “I am a Bit Sickened”: Examining Archetypes of Congres-
sional War Crimes Oversight After My Lai and Abu Ghraib, 205 MIL L. REV. 1, 
10 (2010); David Scheffer, Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law, 8 NW. U.J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS., 30, 24 (2009) (“United States remains in large measure a free 
haven for perpetrators of crimes against humanity [including for] . . . any U.S. 
citizen who may perpetrate a crime against humanity overseas.”). 
226 Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 599-603 (2005) (barring suits 
against the U.S. under sovereign immunity); 1 LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. 
LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS §2.02 (2005). 
227 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-40 (1974); Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, pmbl., Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 
(stating that “the purpose of such  privileges and immunities [for diplomatic 
officials] is . . . to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplo-
matic missions as representing states”) 
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lous lawsuits.228  Exceptions to permit plaintiff claims are 
found in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Bivens 
Doctrine, which is available against individuals.229 
The FTCA can waive sovereign immunity for tort claims 
committed by U.S. government employees,230 making the claim 
available in a manner that would be comparable to a lawsuit 
against a private individual.231  A plaintiff can initiate the suit 
against the United States when government officials or em-
ployees commit torts while acting within the “scope of employ-
ment,” which permits substituting the United States as the de-
fendant.232  However, the FTCA excludes cases involving 
military combat activities during wartime and “claim[s] arising 
in a foreign country.”233 
Sovereign immunity and the list of FTCA exclusions do not 
impede plaintiffs from suing government actors in a “personal 
                                                          
228 Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 
723-24 (2006) (stating that official immunity provides protection from money 
damage suits for claims arising from government actors’ official conduct). 
229 Carlson v. Groen, 446 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1980) (“Four additional factors, 
each suggesting that the Bivens remedy is more effective than the FTCA 
remedy, also support our conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit re-
spondent to the FTCA action . . . “[T]he Bivens remedy in addition to compen-
sating victims, serves a deterrent purpose.  Because the Bivens remedy is re-
coverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA 
remedy against the United States.”). **(quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388  (1971)) 
230 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (2013). 
231 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2013) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting 
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall 
not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages”). 
232 See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2013); 28 
U.S.C. 1346(b) (2013); See also, Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day’s 
Work? Scope of Employment, the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human 
Rights Litigation Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
175, 176 (2008). 
233 See, e.g., § 2680; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 (2004) 
(holding that the FTCA’s “exception bars all claims based on any injury suf-
fered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission 
occurred.”); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that combatant activities are those “activities both necessary to and 
in direct connection with actual hostilities”).  
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capacity” suit,234 which is still generally defended by the De-
partment of Justice.235  Under Bivens, a government agent, 
sued in personal capacity for a claim for damages, will have 
qualified immunity if there is no violation of a clearly estab-
lished constitutional right or if a constitutional deprivation re-
sulted from a government agent’s reasonable mistake.236  Given 
that novel Bivens challenges have been relatively ineffectual 
over the past three decades,237 it is improbable that Iraqis 
would have U.S. constitutional rights for a deprivation of their 
public right to antiquities in their country due to the directives 
of U.S. government agents who executed a war and occupa-
tion.238 
                                                          
234 Seamon, supra note 228, at 722-23. 
235 See, Paul Michael Brown, Personal Liability Tort Litigation Against 
Federal Employees: A Primer, 8 ST. THOMAS L.J. 329, 329 (2011) (reporting 
that the Department of Justice represents thousands of federal employees 
each year in personal civil liability suits). 
236 See e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (holding that 
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not vio-
late clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasona-
ble person would have known”); See generally, John C. Williams, Qualifying 
Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1296-97 (2012).  
237 George D. Brown, ‘Counter-Counter-Terrorism Via Lawsuit’ – The 
Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 845 (2009) (stating that since 1983, 
the Supreme Court has rejected the past seven attempts to apply Bivens ac-
tions in new factual scenarios, based generally on political question grounds).  
238 Foreigners in a zone of occupation are unlikely to have rights under 
the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 
(2001)(holding that it is “well established that certain constitutional protec-
tions available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens 
outside our geographic borders”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-
66, 778 (1950)(holding that nineteen alien petitioners, who were convicted by 
a U.S. military commission for taking hostile actions against the U.S. in Chi-
na and were currently being held in a German prison, were not protected un-
der the Constitution as an American citizen abroad would be protected); Id. 
at 779 (“It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field com-
mander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission 
to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and atten-
tion from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.”); Hi-
rota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (per curiam) (denying habeas re-
lief under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to Japanese officials who 
were convicted by the U.S. military tribunal in Japan, despite that the U.S. 
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Likewise, in Westfall v. Erwin, the Court held that abso-
lute immunity is afforded to federal officials under state tort 
law when acting within the scope of employment, but not when 
torts were committed outside official duties and when officials 
acted discretionarily.
239
  After the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Westfall, Congress quickly enacted the Federal Employees Lia-
bility Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (FELRTCA) 
to accord absolute immunity to U.S. government officials in civ-
il suits for claims arising in foreign countries
240
 and for omis-
sions, negligent, or wrongful acts that those officials commit 
“while acting within the scope of [their] employment.”
241
  How-
                                                                                                                                  
occupied and effectively controlled Japan); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 
311, 320-23 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that nonresident aliens that are seized 
and detained outside U.S. borders do not have constitutional rights). But see, 
e.g., Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 698-99 (1862) (stating that only Con-
gress has the authority to “change the country and all its citizens from a state 
of peace to a state of war,” which meant that the President did not have 
“power to set on foot a blockade under the law of nations, and that the cap-
ture of the vessel and cargo in this case, and in all cases before us in which 
the capture occurred before the 13th of July, 1861, for breach of blockade, or 
as enemies’ property, are illegal and void, and that the decrees of condemna-
tion should be reversed and the vessel and cargo restored.”). It is also unlike-
ly that U.S. citizens would have rights of indemnity against the President or 
other government agents if Iraqis attained remedial relief out of the U.S. 
Treasury for stolen antiquities.  
239 See, Westfall v. Irwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-298 (1988); See also, Doe. v. 
Millan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). 
240  Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, §2679, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 2680k (2012))(noting that exceptions to liability include “[a]ny 
claim arising in a foreign country”) 
241 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2012); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 
F. Supp. 2d 85, 107-09 (D. D.C. 2007) (noting that qualified immunity is 
granted to employees and officials accused of torture).  FELRTCA eliminated 
the discretionary prong at the common law and granted absolute immunity to 
all federal employees irrespective of whether the employee was acting discre-
tionarily and committing a common law tort.  United States v. Smith, 499 
U.S. 160 (1991).  Consequently, a plaintiff’s typical challenge under the 
FELRTCA would be to assert that the employees were acting outside the 
scope of their employment.  In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 
at 110, aff’d sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-
Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105, 108 (D. D.C. 2010) (dismiss-
ing suit against employees and U.S. government).  If they were acting within 
the scope of their official duties, the FTCA provides the exclusive remedy for 
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ever, the policy underlying FELRTCA may not have been in-
tended to shelter officials for intentional or criminal wrongs.242 
Similar to the immunity afforded to heads of state at the 
international level, the US Supreme Court has ruled that the 
President is absolutely immune for official acts taken while in 
office because of the possibility that the President could be dis-
rupted from official duties by plaintiffs with civil damage 
claims.243  Additionally, courts and Congress defer to executive 
prerogative when national security is involved,244 top officials 
may have absolute immunity for civil damages for acts in their 
“discretionary authority in such sensitive areas as national se-
curity or foreign policy,”245 and the Court has been reluctant to 
examine the scope of the Commander in Chief authority on po-
litical questions, standing, ripeness, and mootness grounds af-
ter dozens of cases challenged presidential power during the 
                                                                                                                                  
a federal employee’s common law torts.  28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2013).  
FELRTCA immunity is inapplicable to legal actions against federal employ-
ees when they violate the Constitution or federal statutes, in which case qual-
ified immunity applies.  28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (2013); See Harlow, 457 U.S. 
at 807. 
242 The FELRTCA was designed to protect government employees when 
they act negligently within the scope of their employment, but not to provide 
shelter for intentional torts or criminal acts.  BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH 
CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL HOFFMAN & MICHAEL RATNER, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURT 291-95 (2d. ed. 
2008); See generally Brief for United States Representative Barney Frank as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant Jennifer K. Harbury at 3-4, Harbury v. 
Hayden, 522 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-5282); H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, 
at 5 (1988) (writing that the FELRTCA was intended to make federal em-
ployees immune from suit by making the United States defend the case, un-
less the government defendant is accused of egregious misconduct).  This is 
consistent with precedent.  See e.g. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 
(1975) (an official would not have qualified immunity if the official “knew or 
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of 
official responsibility would violate the constitutional right of the affected, or 
if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of 
constitutional rights or other injury”). 
243 See, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). 
244 Robert Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking Al Qaeda and Iraq, 
56 HOW. L.J. 1, 10-13 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, CFP]; Robert Bejesky, Na-
tional Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter’s Privilege, 24 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 399, 402-05 (2012). 
245 See e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812. 
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Vietnam War.246  On the other hand, the Supreme Court has 
long held “that when the President takes official action, the 
Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted 
within the law”247 and held that the President was not even 
temporarily immune from civil lawsuits unrelated to official 
functions while holding office.248  The next section provides a 
synopsis of the questionable constitutional basis of the Iraq 
war. 
                                                          
246 See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613–16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (refusing 
to rule on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War based on the political 
question doctrine); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(holding that the lawfulness of the President’s directive to mine ports in 
North Vietnam was a non-justiciable political question); Massachusetts v. 
Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 28–34 (1st Cir. 1971) (“[I]n a situation of prolonged but 
undeclared hostilities, where the executive continues to act not only in the 
absence of any conflicting congressional claim of authority but with steady 
congressional support, the Constitution has not been breached.”); Orlando v. 
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (2d. Cir. 1971) (holding that determining the 
constitutionality of the Vietnam War was beyond the scope of judicial re-
view); Robert Bejesky, War Powers Pursuant to False Perceptions and Asym-
metric Information in the “Zone of Twilight,” 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 64-67, 86 
(2012) (noting that the Court had regularly granted certiorari on the Con-
gress-Executive division on the implementation of war powers acts for over 
150 years).  Courts refused to hear cases regarding President Reagan’s ac-
tions in Central America after twenty-nine members of Congress challenged 
the action in federal court. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 334, 339–41 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208–09 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 895, 898–903 (D.C. Cir. 
1982).  Members of Congress similarly challenged President Clinton’s air-
strikes in Kosovo, but once more, the court refused to hear the case.  Camp-
bell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
247 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997); El-Masri v. United States, 
479 F.3d 296, 312 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing that El-Masri is an alleged kid-
napping and torture case) (noting also if the President asserts executive 
privilege, it is “the [C]ourt, not the Executive that determines whether the 
state secret privilege has been properly invoked”).  Also, the leading immuni-
ty case for acts relating to official functions involved President Nixon’s un-
lawfully firing of a Defense Department analyst over adverse testimony be-
fore Congress.  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 731.  This was an important 
substantive matter but it was not directly an act that would reverberate into 
war crimes or an unconstitutional foundation for war that impacts the entire 
country. 
248 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 681. 
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2. Execution of Constitutional War Powers in the 2003 
Invasion 
US law would not likely favor plaintiff claims against US 
officials for losses deriving from the pillaging of the Iraq Na-
tional Museum.  The possibility of US courts accepting a case 
against the President without a finding that the Executive was 
acting outside the scope of presidential authority is remote, 
which suggests that US policy would also be unlikely to favor 
enforcing a foreign judgment against the President even if ICJ 
and customary international law restrictions on head of state 
immunity could be overcome.  Nonetheless, this section pre-
sents an overview of domestic level political events to permit 
the reader to query whether American democracy should ac-
commodate a point at which negligence or misconduct should 
retard the presumption that the President retains a virtual 
impervious immunity.249   
The domestic constitutional process leading to the Iraq 
War was highly-problematic as indicated by later debate over 
censuring President Bush on the false allegations about weap-
ons of mass destruction and statements that Iraq’s former re-
gime had connections to al-Qaeda250 and by the 251 to 166 vote 
in the House of Representatives which referred articles of im-
peachment against the president to the House of Representa-
                                                          
249 Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Consti-
tution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 132 (2009) (speaking generally, “[i]f nations are 
viewed as unitary entities in the international arena, there must be one gov-
ernmental entity that can be held accountable for a nation’s actions in foreign 
affairs, and for the U.S., that can only be the executive branch.”). 
250 Campaign Opens for Censure of Bush, REUTERS, Mar. 18, 2004, avail-
able at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/18/nation/na-antiwar18 (stating 
that “[m]ilitary families and antiwar activists urged Congress to censure 
President Bush for what they called his deception and manipulation of intel-
ligence before the Iraq war.”); New calls for censure emerged after Democrats 
took control of the House and Senate.  Justin Blum, Bush Should Be Cen-
sured by U.S. Congress on Iraq, Senator Says, BLOOMBERG, July 22, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6RBOFNygHQ
A (stating that the proposed censure motion “would criticize Bush for ‘over-
stating the case’ that Saddam Hussein . . .had weapons of mass destruction 
[and for] . . . ‘falsely implying’ a relationship between Hussein and the terror-
ist group al-Qaeda and of having ‘liinks’ to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks”). 
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tives Judiciary Committee.251  The Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) completed its five-year investigation of the 
conditions leading to the Iraq War and the SSCI Chair stated 
that, “the Bush Administration led the nation to war under 
false pretenses.”252   
Congress granted an Authorization for the Use of Force 
(AUMF) based on the Bush administration allegations of a 
supposed arsenal of prohibited weapons inside Iraq and did not 
condition the need to use force on displacing a foreign govern-
ment.253  Professors Ackerman and Hathaway emphasize that 
the AUMF was a limited authorization to use force conditioned 
on there being an actual imminent threat, which means that 
when the White House began offering additional rationaliza-
tions after the war began, particularly of humanitarian inter-
vention, “such talk was blatantly inconsistent with the plain 
language of the 2002 resolution.”254  The detriment to Ameri-
                                                          
251 Kucinich Effort to Impeach Bush Kicked into Limbo, CNN, June 11, 
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/11/kucinich.impeach.vote/ (em-
phasizing that most of the resolution dealt with manufacturing false claims 
for the Iraq War); Dennis J. Kucinich, Articles of Impeachment of President 
George W. Bush, arts. I-III (June 10, 2008), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080920014632/http://kucinich.house.gov/News/D
ocumentPrint.aspx?DocumentID=93581 (involving the use of secret propa-
ganda to “manufacture a false case for war against Iraq,” misrepresenting 
that there was Iraqi complicity in 9/11, and “Misleading the American People 
and Members of Congress to Believe Iraq Possessed Weapons of Mass De-
struction, to Manufacture a False Case for War”). 
252 Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Press Release of Intelligence 
Committee (June 5, 2008), 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298775 (quoting SSCI 
Chairman John D. Rockefeller).  The stimulus to action was formulated via 
propaganda, high level directives, and political initiatives within the Bush 
administration.  See supra Part IV(B)(4). 
253 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
2002, H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002) [hereinafter AUMF-Iraq].  The 
President understood that the terms were conditions because he reiterated 
them verbatim in a letter to Congress two days before the attack to comply 
with the 48-hour information requirement in § 2(b).  Letter from George W. 
Bush, President of the U.S., to Speaker of the H.R. (Mar. 19, 2003), available 
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/19/iraq/main544604.shtml. 
254 Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitu-
tion: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 464 
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cans was ominous as the war and occupation resulted in 4,488 
U.S. military deaths and 134,000 Iraqi civilian deaths and cost 
American taxpayers $2.2 trillion dollars.255 
  The White House actuated puissant agenda setting for 
war.256  A significant percentage of the American public was 
primed to believe the threat claims ostensibly because of the 
frequent reiteration of false allegations, but members of Con-
gress opposed a rapid approval for the AUMF and complained 
that the Bush Administration was pushing the issue up against 
the November 2002 elections to pressure Democrats to author-
ize the use of force.257  One of the staunchest opponents was 
Senator Byrd who observed the evidentiary foundation and ac-
                                                                                                                                  
(2011); Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 78, at 350-69.   
255 CBS Evening News for Mar. 19, 2013 (news clip on file with author); 
See generally, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION 
DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT (2008) (estimating even 
more dire economic costs to $3 trillion by including derivative expenditures); 
Bejesky, Politico, supra note 209, at 84-91 (addressing a chronology of how 
the administration avoided discussion of expenses and negative ramifications 
on the American economy). 
256 Charles Lewis & Mark Reading-Smith, False Pretenses, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY, Jan. 23, 2008, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2008/01/23/5641/false-pretenses (depicting 
that administration officials made approximately 300% more false state-
ments about threats from Iraq than in the previous month); See generally su-
pra Part IV(B)(4). 
257 SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY’S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. REP. NO. 108-
301, at 12, 299 (2004) (noting that several members of Congress objected to 
authorizing the use of force without having more information, and disap-
proved of the President speaking publicly about dangers without an NIE); 
Jeffrey A. Botelho, Congressional Responsibility in Controlling the War Ma-
chine, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 305 (2008-2009) (reporting that CNN noted that 
the Executive’s advocacy elevated political stakes: “He has democrats in a box 
. . . It’s very hard for them to oppose the president, especially just weeks be-
fore the November election.”); Editorial, The Politics of War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
20, 2002, at A26, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/20/opinion/the-politics-of-war.html (“The 
newly bellicose mood on Capitol Hill materialized almost overnight. Last 
night, Democrats wanted the Security Council to act first and were calling for 
measured consideration of the political and military issues involved in going 
to war. The haste . . . is clearly motivated by campaign politics. Republicans 
are already running attack ads against Democrats on Iraq”). 
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centuated that the President was using “absurd pressure to act 
[twenty-seven] days before an election.” 258  Byrd further ex-
pounded: “And before we put this great nation on the track to 
war I want to see more evidence, hard evidence, not more Pres-
idential rhetoric.”259  
   Many Intelligence Community officials and experts 
acknowledged that intelligence was being crafted around the 
executive’s policy of invasion.260  Georgetown Professor Paul 
Pillar, a retired senior CIA analyst, explaining that “intelli-
                                                          
258 Senator Robert C. Byrd, Congress Must Resist the Rush to War, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/10/opinion/congress-
must-resist-the-rush-to-war.html (“Are we too feeble to resist the demands of 
a president who is determined to bend the collective will of Congress to his 
will . . . I have searched for that single piece of evidence that would convince 
me that the president must have in his hands, before the month is out, open-
ended Congressional authorization to deliver an unprovoked attack on Iraq. I 
remain unconvinced”); 148 CONG. REC. 19682 (Oct. 9, 2002) (Senator Patrick 
Leahy) (stating that “[m]any respected and knowledgeable people—former 
senior military officers and diplomats among them—have expressed strong 
reservations about this resolution. . . . But they have not seen that evidence, 
and neither have I. We have heard a lot of bellicose rhetoric, but what are the 
facts?”). 
259 ROBERT C. BYRD, LOSING AMERICA: CONFRONTING A RECKLESS AND 
ARROGANT PRESIDENCY 233 (2004) (Statement on floor of Senate, Oct. 10, 
2002). 
260 See generally Robert Bejesky, The SSCI Investigation of the Iraq War: 
Part II: Politicization of Intelligence, 40 S.U. L. REV. 243 (2013).  The Bush 
Administration initiated agenda setting with allegations and demanded a 
congressional vote and a UN authorization to use force six months before the 
war actually occurred.  Robert Bejesky, Political Penumbras of Taxes and 
War Powers for the 2012 Election, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 19-30 (2012); Be-
jesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 78, at 303-15.  This agenda setting was 
prior to the Intelligence Community taking any steps toward the production 
of the high-flawed and condemned (in process and substance) National Intel-
ligence Estimate.  See Robert Bejesky, The SSCI Investigation of the Iraq 
War: Part I: A Split Decision, 40 S.U. L. REV. 1 (2012).  Senators requested 
that an NIE be produced because one had never been produced that was de-
voted to Iraqi WMD programs.  S. REP. NO. 108-301, at 298.  The work 
launched on September 12 at the National Intelligence Office under CIA Di-
rector Tenet’s guidance and eleven days later the draft NIE was distributed 
to agencies, and one week later the final copy was distributed.  Id. at 9, 12-13, 
52 (noting that agencies received the draft on September 23).  Experts esti-
mated that a more reasonable time frame for production for such a complex 
NIE might reasonably have taken between three to six months.  Id. at 11. 
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gence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made” 
and that the “intelligence community’s own work was politi-
cized.” 261  The SSCI quoted an analyst who was involved in the 
production of the notorious NIE and stated “[T]he going-in as-
sumption was we were going to war, so this NIE was to be writ-
ten with that in mind. We were going to war, which meant 
American men and women had to be properly given the benefit 
of the doubt of what they would face. . .That was what was said 
to us.”262  The account is consistent with all of the later-
released revelations about preplanning for war that was em-
phasized in Part IV(B)(4). 
  Thus, the justification for the use of force, as specified in 
diplomacy before the UN and as contained in the AUMF-Iraq 
several days after the NIE was prepared, exclusively involved 
possession of weapons that were prohibited by UN Resolution 
and could pose a security threat.263  However, the analyst sur-
prisingly asserted that the intelligence community prepared 
the NIE, which specified the evidence for war pursuant to Con-
gress’s request, under the assumption that the war was inevi-
table.  Ironically, one month after the war, ABC News inter-
viewed Bush Administration officials who stated that they did 
                                                          
261 Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, FOR. AFFAIRS, 
Mar./Apr. 2006 available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61503/paul-r-pillar/intelligence-
policyand-the-war-in-ira. 
262 S. REP. NO. 108-301, at 505; JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR 79-80 (2006) 
(writing about interviews taken at a CIA meeting, a CIA official remarked 
that they were told from the senior officials from CIA headquarters to the 
station chiefs was simple: “The game is on. We are going to war in Iraq. 
There will be no further debate on the issue. . ..”[One official remarked:] “We 
kept saying that the president has decided we are going to war, and if you 
don’t like it, quit.”); JAMES BAMFORD, A PRETEXT FOR WAR 333-37 (2004) (writ-
ing about high-level directives that were given at a CIA meeting in January 
2003, “[I]f Bush wants to go to war, it’s your job to give him a reason to do so. 
. ..”[One of the attendees interpreted the directive:] “This is something that 
the American public, if they ever heard, if they ever knew, they would be out-
raged.. . .”[Another CIA officer stated:]It was criminal the way we were im-
plicitly deceiving people”). 
263 AUMF-Iraq, supra note 253, § 3; Letter from George W. Bush, supra 
note 253; Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 254, at 464; Bejesky, Weapon 
Inspections, supra note 78, at 350-69. 
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not lie, but that “the administration emphasized the danger of 
Saddam’s weapons to gain the legal justification for war from 
the United Nations and to stress the danger at home to Ameri-
cans.”264  The Bush Administration officials stated that there 
was a new reason for war, which was to exhibit “a global show 
of American power and democracy.”265 
With respect to the failure to protect antiquities during the 
war, in September 2004, anonymous government officials 
“leaked” the contents of two classified reports prepared specifi-
cally for President Bush by the National Intelligence Council 
three months before the war.266  The reports assessed that an 
invasion “would result in a deeply divided Iraqi society prone to 
violent internal conflict,”267 which could be a warning that soci-
etal unrest and conflict could endanger the Iraq National Mu-
seum.  Hence, the Bush Administration dismissed intelligence 
reports that predicted insurgencies and societal violence after 
an invasion as “just guessing”268 and provided express and im-
                                                          
264 John Cochran, Officials: 9/11 Was Main Reason for War, ABC NEWS, 
Apr. 26, 2003,http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128467&page=1. 
265 Id. 
266 See generally Senate Select Comm.  on Intelligence, Prewar Intelli-
gence Assessments About Postwar Iraq, S. Rep. No. 110-76 (2007) (reviewing 
the studies). 
267 Douglas Jehl & David E. Sanger, Prewar Assessment on Iraq Saw 
Chance of Strong Divisions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/28/politics/28intel.html?pagewanted=all 
(warning that Hussein supporters and insurgents would possibly wage guer-
rilla warfare and an “insurgency against the new Iraqi government or Ameri-
can-led forces….”); S. REP. NO. 110-76, at 93-106 (noting that pre-war as-
sessments published by other agencies in the weeks prior to the invasion 
presumed there would be an invasion of Iraq and public accounts of violent 
events inside Iraq in many cases did resemble the claims in the reports).  The 
January 2003 National Intelligence Council reports assessed that establish-
ing a viable democracy in Iraq would be a long and turbulent process, that it 
would be necessary for an outside military to occupy the country because it 
would be a “deeply divided society,” that oil revenues would make the politi-
cal and economic restructuring less difficult, that there would be humanitari-
an and refugee challenges, and that there would be outside malevolent forces 
undermining American efforts.  S. REP. NO. 110-76, at 4 (citing NIC, 
PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES IN A POST-SADDAM IRAQ 5-6, 25-28 (Jan. 2003); NIC, 
REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ 18, 20 (Jan. 2003)). 
268 Jehl & Sanger, supra note 267. See also Douglas Jehl, U.S. Intelli-
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plicit portrayals to the American public before the war that 
there would be no post-war conflict (other than from holdovers 
allegiant to Hussein),269 but considered the allegations in the 
NIE about threats that led to war so ironclad that the White 
House spent six months persuading Americans to accept the al-
legations.270 
V. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
The Iraqi Interior Ministry’s Economic Crimes Depart-
ment’s investigations seek to reacquire antiquities that were 
looted from the Iraq National Museum in April 2003.  The ran-
sacking unfolded after domestic law and order dissolved follow-
ing what many called an illegal war.271  International law and 
Iraqi law provide a substantive basis for a duty to protect the 
items in the Iraqi National Museum, which suffered losses that 
would likely not have occurred “but for” the war of aggression 
                                                                                                                                  
gence Shows Pessimism on Iraq’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/16/politics/16intel.html?pagewanted=print&
position=  (White House Press Secretary McClellan remarked: “You know, 
every step of the way in Iraq there have been pessimists and hand-wringers 
who said it can’t be done. . . And every step of the way, the Iraqi leadership 
and the Iraqi people have proven them wrong because they are determined to 
have a free and peaceful future”).  The Bush Administration also ignored the 
advice of the U.S. military commanders who assumed it would be costly to 
enforce a peacekeeping effort and who recalled how societal chaos can erupt 
after a powerful leader is deposed, which had just recently occurred in the 
former Yugoslavia.  Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, A National Security Agenda 
Revisited, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 829 850-51 (2010). 
269 James C. O’Brien, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Warlords and Recon-
struction After Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y99, 102-03 (2004); De-
partment of Defense Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2004: Hearing Before 
the H. Budget Comm., 108th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2003) (statement of Paul Wol-
fowitz, U.S. Deputy Sec’y of Def.) (“It’s hard to conceive that it would take 
more forces to provide stability to post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to 
conduct the war itself and secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces 
and his army.  Hard to imagine.”). 
270 See generally Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy, supra note 244; Be-
jesky, CFP, supra note 244; Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 277, 
at 875-82. 
271 See supra Parts III, IV(B)(4). 
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or if the invading/occupying force had secured the museum.
272
  
This article presented a hypothetical assessment of a tort law-
like damage remedy, with a pivotal procedural question of 
whether a plaintiff-government (or a non-government actor in a 
qui tam form of action given the political discord at stake)273 
could sue in an Iraqi court against a foreign state, the head of 
state, or lower-level officials, as a civil defendant.  The article 
also estimated—using the US as an example—what level of 
sovereign or official immunity might be afforded in the official’s 
home jurisdiction, either as the court system accepting jurisdic-
tion or the forum being requested to enforce the judgment of an 
Iraqi court, and employed the precedent of criminal immunity 
as a basis for considering civil immunity and a universal of-
fense as an act that gives rise to tortious damage.  The frame-
work was not exhaustive, given the complexities, but the anal-
ysis highlighted pivotal inquiries in relation to the chronology 
of the looting. 
With respect to a suit in an Iraqi court, commencing a civil 
                                                          
272 See supra Parts II, III, IV(B)(4), IV(C)(2) (explaining the international 
rules that protect antiquities, string of events that led to an illegal invasion, 
and a failure to heed the intelligence warnings about a probable result of so-
cietal chaos following invasion, including a failure to adequately respond dur-
ing an effective occupation after Iraqi security forces were disbanded); Robin 
Wright & Ellen Knickmeyer, U.S. Lowers Sights on What Can Be Achieved in 
Iraq, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2005, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/ 
13/AR2005081300853.html (remarking that the Bush “administration says 
[Hussein] ran down the country.  But most damage was from looting” during 
the invasion and occupation). 
273 In the U.S., individuals can sue on behalf of the U.S. government.  
Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Military Service Members 
Have Standing to File Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act?, 34 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 45, 51 (2004).  The public treasury benefits by receiving between 
70 and 100 percent of the remedy.  31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2013).  There would un-
derstandably be collective problems or weak political will to facilitate such an 
action in Iraq because most of the population presumably favors post-Hussein 
Iraq to Hussein’s rule and there would likely be a dominant perception that a 
military invasion was necessary to achieve that circumstance, but this should 
not necessarily preclude recovery.  If the Iraqi government would not bring 
such an action against top Bush Administration officials, Iraq would likely 
need some form of qui tam provision. 
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case is less of an infringement to official immunity than physi-
cally bringing a head of state to another domestic jurisdiction 
on criminal charges, as was the context in the ICJ Arrest War-
rant case.  That unilateral assertion of criminal jurisdiction 
would seemingly be restricted on a head of state pursuant to 
current norms of customary international law, but indictment 
for universal jurisdiction crimes would not be prohibited of 
government officials below the head of state and minister of 
foreign affairs274 or of the head of state when there is a collec-
tive of countries, rather than a unilateral state action, willing 
to impose liability on the head of state.275  Moreover, in the con-
text of indicting a head of state on crimes against humanity in 
a foreign court, ICJ Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buer-
genthal provided a minority opinion and believed that univer-
sal jurisdiction should be permitted in absentia,276 and in 2012, 
a specially-constituted fact-finding tribunal in Malaysia found 
George W. Bush and other top officials guilty in absentia for 
crimes against humanity for developing and executing interro-
gation programs that consisted of torture.277 
                                                          
274 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 414 (2013) (noting the applicability of the immunity for 
heads of state only while they are in office and that subordinate top-level 
state agents have a restrictive immunity for official acts); See supra Part 
IV(B)(2). 
275 Violations of international law can lead to liability and war crimes do 
not only pierce the veil of sovereign immunity, but have also led to personal 
culpability for political leaders who carried out those acts.  See supra Parts 
IV(B)(C).  Criminal acts are not clearly official acts of state that should re-
ceive sovereign immunity protections, and it may also be reasonable to ques-
tion whether there should be, first and foremost, a payout for liability from 
the state’s public treasury to the degree that the leader acted ultra vires to 
the principal populace. 
276 Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 16 (Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal). 
277 Yvonne Ridley, Bush Convicted of War Crimes in Absentia, FOR. 
POLICY J., May 12, 2012 (“In what is the first ever conviction of its kind any-
where in the world, the former US President [Bush] and seven key members 
of his administration were . . . found guilty of war crimes” in absentia in Ma-
laysia for war crimes arising out of the torture interrogation programs); See 
also Jaclyn Belczyk, Malaysia Rights Group Finds Bush and Associates 
Guilty of War Crimes in Symbolic Trial, JURIST, May 11, 2012. 
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With respect to a claim being filed in the US, official im-
munity places limits on plaintiff lawsuits against US offi-
cials,278 but there are also substantive policies at stake that 
could favor granting compensation for the destruction and theft 
of artifacts.279  Another question is whether US courts would 
favor equal treatment between foreign and domestic leaders.  
The Schooner Exchange (1812) originated the common law 
head of state immunity280 and U.S. courts have recently afford-
ed immunity to foreign heads of state in civil suits by deferring 
                                                          
278 See supra Part IV(C)(1). 
279 International law is well-established as to the right to compensate for 
destruction of antiquities and artifacts.  Frank G. Fechner, The Fundamental 
Aims of Cultural Property Law, 7 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 376, 378-80 
(1998); David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and 
Its Emergence into Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 349, 387-
89 (1993).  Scholars have expressed there were violations of international law 
and requirements to assess liability in the case of the destruction at the Iraq 
National Museum.  Lucille A. Roussin, Cultural Heritage and Identity, 11 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 707 (2003); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Occupational 
Failures and the Legality of Armed Conflict: The Case of Iraqi Cultural Prop-
erty, OHIO ST. U. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 23 
(2004); Patty Gerstenblith, Legal Damage Control for Iraq’s Looted Cultural 
Heritage: The Need for U.S. Import Restrictions, JURIST (Feb. 23, 2004).   
Not only is there an obligation to avoid taking positive action that would 
destroy property, but there are also obligations to respect and secure cultural 
property during war and occupation.   Convention for the Protection of Cul-
tural Property, supra note 30, arts. 2-4; Sabine von Schorlemer, Legal 
Changes in the Regime of the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Con-
flict, 9 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 43, 45 (2004); Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in 
Post-conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant’s Law-
Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285, 295 (2005).  US law and policy has fa-
vored efforts to promote the recovery of Iraqi antiquities.  In October 2008, 
the U.S. Department of State initiated an Iraq Cultural Heritage Project and 
granted $13 million to a non-governmental organization, International Relief 
and Development” to assist in rebuilding Iraq’s lost cultural items.  Singer, 
supra note 110, at 1.  George Bush gave Matthew Bogdanos, a U.S. Marine 
Reserve colonel and district attorney in New York, the National Humanities 
Medal in 2005 for seeking to recover stolen and missing Iraqi antiquities.  
Brian Baxter, After Iraq, Lawyers Discuss the Way Forward, THE AMER. 
LAWYER, Mar. 27, 2013, available at http://www.reedsmith.com/files/ 
News/ea8df378-37c3-4f93-8595-dcc54458ccc2/Presentation/NewsAttachment/ 
58711b03-338c-40d1-9f04-e11836367f25/After%20Iraq%20Lawyers 
%20Discuss%20Way%20Forward.pdf. 
280 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
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first to the US executive’s position if the executive spoke on the 
issue of immunity in cases such as Lafontant v. Aristide281 and 
Tachiona v. Mugabe,282 and initially in Estate of Domingo v. 
Republic of the Philippines.283  However, in other cases, U.S. 
courts have not granted immunity to foreign heads of state in 
civil cases for wrongful acts taken while serving in the official 
capacity as a foreign head of state.284  Most recently, the Su-
preme Court decided Samatar v. Yousuf (2010) and held that 
individual foreign government officials and employees do not 
have FSIA immunity and that U.S. courts might exercise juris-
diction over an individual who had been prime minister and 
held other cabinet positions while purportedly committing hu-
                                                          
281 Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 130-31, 139–40 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994) (noting that the executive position of granting head of state immunity 
prevails in a case involving a plaintiff suing President Aristide for allegedly 
ordering the execution of the plaintiff’s husband). 
282 Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 264-65, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(with U.S. executive encouragement, dismissing plaintiff’s civil case for al-
leged torture, execution, and other crimes ordered by top officials). 
283 Estate of Domingo v. Republic of the Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782, 
786 (W.D. Wash. 1982).  The immunity was waived in the later case.  In re 
Doe, 860 F.2d at 45.  In 1986, President Corazon Aquino granted broad power 
to investigate the human rights abuses during the 1976-1986 dictatorship of 
Ferdinand Marcos, but the committee never provided a final report.  Van 
Dyke, supra note 159, at 157.  Instead 9,531 victims of human rights abuses 
have been seeking compensation by litigating claims against Marco’s Estate.  
Id. at 156.  The estate paid $10 million to thousands of Filipino victims after 
prevailing in a 2011 class-action judgment in federal court in Hawaii.  James 
C. McKinley Jr., After Conviction, Focus Turns to Ownership of Marcos Art-
work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/nyregion/after-conviction-focus-turns-to-
rightful-ownership-of-marcos-art.html.  It may also be controversial that the 
US government supported Marcos, the US military had bases in the Philip-
pines when Marcos suspended the constitution and democracy to make him-
self a dictator, and the military supported the coup.  Bejesky, Politico, supra 
note 209, at 55-56.  Yet US courts had questions about whether the official 
immunity should be recognized in the US. 
284 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying head of 
state immunity to Radovan Karadžić); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 
1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that Noriega was not entitled to immuni-
ty because he was not constitutionally elected, Panama did not seek immuni-
ty, and personal acts with drug trafficking were at issue); See also In re Doe, 
860 F.2d at 45.  Other than Kadic v. Karadžić, these cases might be distin-
guished from the deeper gravity of harm that coexists with war crimes. 
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man rights atrocities against the plaintiffs.285  If U.S. courts 
are open to holding individual foreign heads of state civilly re-
sponsible, perhaps it is reasonable to not oppose the domestic 
or foreign courts from holding a top U.S. government official 
civilly responsible for universal wrongs.286 
                                                          
285 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010); This is a change in 
the law that addressed a split among the federal circuits.  PETER HENNER, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LAW, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
259-60 (2009) (explaining that there was a split in the federal circuits over 
whether plaintiffs can attain jurisdiction over individual foreign officials un-
der FSIA). 
286 However, a key element has been whether the home jurisdiction of the 
head of state permits the suit in the foreign court.  Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 
F. Supp. at 130-31, 139–40.  Unless a current or future president strips for-
mer President Bush of immunity, a civil claim of liability would be less likely 
to proceed in a foreign court, although the immunity is not so clear with sub-
ordinate officials. 
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